




Scenario: Frankie and Saanvi are a lesbian couple who 
have been together for almost two decades. They met in 
college and are now in their mid-thirties. They had never 
really thought about getting married, but in the wake of 
legal and political changes in the United States, as well as 
changes in their employment and financial status, changing 
community mores around legalized same-sex marriage, and 
discussions of the possibility of having and legally protecting 
children, they are beginning to explore the option. Both 
partners work in creative fields. In recent years Saanvi’s 
work has been especially well received. Much to both 
partners’ surprise, Saanvi has been generating substantial 
income over the past few years and has become unexpectedly 
wealthy.
Through the vantage point of a lesbian couple ambivalent 
about the institution of marriage, this scenario traces most 
of the central legal questions surrounding marriage and 
divorce, conceiving and raising children, owning property 
within married relationships, and preparing for and 
resolving dissolution of a marital union.
1. “Method Lawyering” is both a reversal of the Lawyering Method elements used as a framing 
device throughout this work, and an allusion to method actors’ efforts to immerse themselves 
in the totality of their characters to gain a deeper understanding of their circumstances. 
Method actors believe that there is no other way to gain such a rich sense of their characters’ 
contexts than to understand and identify with their lives to the greatest extent achievable. 
The immersion teaching discussed here similarly seeks expanded comprehension through 
experience.
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A. Teaching Law by Immersion
Informed by the adage “show, don’t tell,” this article seeks to provide an 
immersive introduction to immersive teaching and learning in law school. 
Professor Peggy Cooper Davis,2 together with her collaborator Danielle 
Davenport,3 initially wrote the above-sketched scenario as a portion of the 
Family Practice4 course they taught together at NYU School of Law (now 
with Brence Pernell5). The scenarios were subsequently adapted for a 2018 
Harvard Law School seminar Professional Responsibility in Family Practice, 
taught by Professor Davis,6 and then again reshaped for use in a simulation-
based family law survey titled Family Law in Practice that I teach at New 
York Law School.7 These various courses differ significantly in purpose and 
pitch, though all are centered on student-lawyers working through the same 
principal narratives.8 In addition to sharing the central stories and characters, 
this array of quite disparate courses uses a common instructional model that 
we9 call the immersion method.10 
2. John S.R. Shad Professor of Lawyering and Ethics & Director, Experiential Learning Lab, 
NYU School of Law.
3. Actor, playwright, and Teaching Fellow, NYU School of Law Experiential Learning Lab.
4.  See Family Practice Taught by Peggy Cooper Davis, New York UNiversitY school of law, https://
www.law.nyu.edu/node/29420.
5. Assistant General Counsel, MRDC and Adjunct Professor, NYU School of Law.
6. See Professional responsibility in Family Law Practice Taught by Peggy Cooper Davis, New York UNiversitY 
school of law, https://www.law.nyu.edu/node/29421.
7. See Family Law in Practice, New York UNiversitY school of law, https://www.nyls.edu/
family-law-in-practice/.
8. The Frankie/Saanvi scenario makes up the bulk of the courses discussed here, but all also 
include a second scenario that introduces the child protection system and explores both 
parental/familial autonomy and the oversight of the state. That scenario deepens students’ 
understanding of tensions pertaining to liberty and order in the family law context, and 
raises important considerations of race, class, and education in family courts. 
9. Pronoun references in this work are a little complicated. I owe a great debt to Davis and 
Davenport as the primary creators of the characters these courses are centered around, and 
to Davis as the originator of the instructional design these courses use. I contributed to the 
revision work that Davis and Davenport undertook to emphasize professional responsibility 
issues for the Harvard version, and have intermittently continued to consult in the ongoing 
partnership between Davis and Pernell. Simultaneously, with permission I adapted 
the narratives to fit the needs and design of my own class. Thus, much of the work and 
conversation around these courses has felt intensely collaborative. I therefore use “we” in 
this article to refer to the fruitful intersections of this alliance. I use “I” when referring solely 
to my own particular class.
10. As designated by Professor Davis in a separate collaboration that included Davis, Susan L. 
Brooks (Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law), Susan S. Kuo (South Carolina 
School of Law) and me. 
 We want to be careful not to suggest, however, that we believe this kind of law teaching is 
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The immersion method integrates doctrinal, practical, and values training 
in legal education by drawing freely from the most sophisticated techniques of 
case method, simulation, and clinical teaching. Though some class meetings 
look and feel like traditional case-driven law classes, the instruction and 
learning in immersion courses—particularly of foundational legal doctrine—is 
driven entirely by the simulated client work.11 
Frequently in our immersion classes students are given some background 
cases and statutes to start from. They are also sometimes given more directed 
questions to consider while other students are working on different issues. 
From these beginning points, the student-lawyers must then formulate their 
own research inquiries, acquaint themselves with the law in question, and 
prepare to engage in the next lawyering task required by the case.12 Instructors 
devote considerable time in class meetings to helping students unpack client 
narratives, identify legal issues, and plan their research and client work. But 
in the immersion classroom, there is often a collaborative feel of the professor 
guiding what is ultimately a student-led discussion rather than simply assigning 
work or interrogating students’ comprehension. 
The lawyering tasks the students undertake in the course include preparing 
case memos, briefing supervising attorneys, interviewing experts, counseling 
clients, preparing documents for the client, and advocating or negotiating on 
the client’s behalf. With faculty guidance and expert supervision, students 
unprecedented. Others before us have built courses with educational goals growing out 
of simulated client work. In fact, Susan B. Apel has already successfully done so in the 
same field of family law. See Susan B. Apel, No More Casebooks: Using Simulation-Based Learning 
to Educate Future Family Law Practitioners, 49 fam. ct. rev. 700 (2011) [hereinafter No More 
Casebooks]. Relatedly, see Andrew Schepard & J. Herbie DiFonzo, Hofstra’s Family Law with 
Skills Course: Implementing FLER (The Family Law Education Reform Project), 49 fam. ct. rev. 685 
(2011). Regrettably, we were not aware of these prior works when we constructed our own 
family law immersion courses. It would have undoubtedly enriched our work had we been. 
Yet, there remains some benefit to having arrived independently at similar objectives, and 
our goals are perhaps more global and less directly preparatory for practice than theirs.
11. This coverage of legal rules in direct response to the requirements of well-chosen simulations 
is what distinguishes immersive learning from the exercises many colleagues add to their 
doctrinal instruction in casebook courses. Such simulations are frequently wonderful 
opportunities for students to apply legal rules and consolidate their mastery of key concepts, 
and I use these kinds of projects in many of my own courses. Yet, I distinguish them from 
fully immersive learning if they are designed to reinforce or supplement what is conceived of 
as the core learning in a course.
12. This article’s goal is to give readers some of the feel of what these classes do. A very different 
type of writing would be required to detail all of the logistics of the course. It, therefore, 
skims over important considerations such as when we use actors in roles as clients (some, 
but deliberately as infrequently as possible to make the course economically feasible and 
reproducible), how the course is scheduled (for mine, just like any other doctrinal class that 
meets twice a week in an ordinary classroom), how we conduct in-role work in class with a 
manageable number of students rather than the whole class, or how as faculty we move back 
and forth between more professorial roles to acting in more supervisory capacities to guide/
coach students through the simulations. Any of us who teach these classes would be happy 
to provide syllabi, materials, or consultation to other faculty who would be interested in 
exploring this kind of teaching for their own courses.
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teach themselves the basics of family law doctrine13 while simultaneously 
practicing and critically examining lawyering interactions and honing their 
research, writing, and legal drafting skills. In my course, roughly half of the 
class sessions are conducted entirely in role working on parts of the simulation. 
The remaining class sessions are conducted as out-of-role workshops where 
the students and I work together to ensure that they understand the law and 
the facts, have located the primary sources they need, and understand them 
and are using them effectively.14
As faculty, then, we get to lead the same kinds of careful examinations 
of rules of law that more traditional Socratic classrooms generate, just done 
through the lens of a specific client’s problems. Meanwhile, our students learn 
legal doctrine in ways that are likely to foster retention15 and reinforce basic 
law school skills of case reading, statutory analysis, and application of rules to 
facts, all while developing additional skills they will need in the profession.16 
Immersion teaching helps fulfill the ABA mandate that law graduates complete 
at least six credits of experiential coursework.17 
We love teaching immersion classes. They provide some of the structure of 
traditional law teaching while pushing the boundaries of learning from work 
that feels real and has a practical and personal dimension. There is simply 
13. We do ensure students learn the basic rules of family law they will need for practice and 
the bar exam. In my class, this is tested by a take-home examination in which students are 
expected to apply the rules they have learned to new facts that differ substantially from 
those raised in the course simulations. This shows students (and my administration!) that 
even in this new format, they have covered what they would be expected to learn in a more 
traditional family law course.
14. Others have pointed out that some of what this article describes and proposes may be 
less of a radical (read: easier) shift for me than for some legal educators. I have perhaps 
an unusually intersectional law teaching background. I began my career as a practitioner 
handling individual cases, and I have substantial experience teaching a variety of traditional 
doctrinal courses, along with simulation-based lawyering skills courses, legal writing and 
research, all overlaid with a background in learning theory and academic enhancement. 
All of these are at least somewhat relevant to undertaking the kind of immersion teaching 
this article describes. But while that degree of variety in teaching assignments may not be 
common, it is hardly unusual for law professors to bring a diverse array of personal and 
professional expertise to their classes. I firmly believe any skilled law faculty who wanted 
to undertake this kind of teaching could so do well in ways that built upon their own 
professional experiences. 
15. Nellie Munin & Yael Efron, Role-Playing Brings Theory to Life in a Multicultural Learning Environment, 
66 J. legal edUc. 309, 313 (2017); see also Nadja Alexander & Michelle LeBaron, Death of the 
Role-Play, 31 hamliNe J. PUb. l. & Pol’Y 459, 466 (2010) (in-role work “is said to yield deeper 
and broader learning”). Empirical support for the common assertion that experiential 
learning promotes retention has been especially well documented in medical training. See, 
e.g., Rahul R. Bogam, Effect of Simulation Based Education on Knowledge of Medical Students in Context 
of Community Medicine, 3 iNt’l J. med. res. & health sci. 651 (2014).
16. This is true both for family law specialist skills (e.g., drafting prenuptial agreements) and for 
more general practice readiness (e.g., writing client advice letters or negotiation).
17. ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools 2014-2015, Standards 301(b), 302, 
americaN bar associatioN (2014-2015).
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something different, deeper, and more magically enriched about learning that 
arises from invested personal experience.
B. An Article Modeling Immersion Methodology
This article is framed in vignettes that illustrate parts of a specific client 
problem, then move out toward thinking through (some of)18 what would be 
needed to address that problem, and then proceed more abstractly toward 
using that experience to examine (some of)19 the processes both student-
lawyers and faculty-supervisors have engaged in.20 
Each of the first four sections of this article shows a portion of what students 
do in the corresponding segment of the course. These sections then come 
from a different angle to surface some of the considerations that went into 
building and teaching that segment. I hope this structure provides an intriguing 
dialogue between the student-lawyers’ processes and the faculty processes that 
went into engineering those student experiences. The article then wraps up 
in Part V with a consideration of ways the immersion method merges clinical 
methodology the essentially doctrinal/Langdellian purpose of most law 
school lecture courses.
With such ambitiously layered objectives, it may be helpful to have some 
sort of grounding armature to structure this examination/modeling of the 
immersion family law course. Many related-but-differing descriptions of the 
components of experiential learning exist, and in this article I am choosing 
(not entirely arbitrarily) to rely on one version that shares a common DNA 
with the genesis of this family law course: the Elements of the Lawyering 
Method as developed and refined by the NYU Lawyering Program.21 The 
18. All legal work is incredibly multifaceted, and the dynamics of interpersonal interaction 
and intrapersonal awareness add additional layers to lawyers’ professional work. Thus the 
topics in any one of the snippets included here could easily fill volumes. I am critical of the 
limitations of my own judgments about what to draw attention to, but then this article is 
intended to be illustrative rather than all-inclusive.
19. Id.
20. As, inevitably, do all client/problem-based teaching methodologies. See Wyatt G. Sassman, 
Cases as Fictions: Clinical Methods in Teaching and Scholarship, 4 savaNNah l. rev. 95, 106 (2017) 
(describing clinical methods for teaching legal doctrine as “analysis [that] starts with the 
client’s goals and moves outward to what legal tools are available in the doctrine. The 
availability of a specific legal tool is dependent on the presence of both the fictional client’s 
need and the necessary contextual facts.”). 
21. The Lawyering Method: The Four Elements, New York University School of Law exPerieNtial 
learNiNg lab, https://www.law.nyu.edu/node/29418 [hereinafter exPerieNtial learNiNg 
lab]. The Lawyering Method builds on the multiple intelligence work of researchers 
such as Howard Gardner. It presupposes that excellence in law practice requires a range 
of intellectual, interpersonal, and emotional skills. Refinements in defining the Lawyering 
Method were developed as a collective effort combining the thinking of leading scholars 
across an array of disciplines, including Anthony G. Amsterdam (law), Jerome Bruner 
(psychology), and Carol Gilligan (psychology), as well as dozens of thoughtful participants 
in the NYU Lawyering Theory Colloquium and the NYU Lawyering Program Workways 
pedagogy working group.
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article is structured with the four Lawyering Method elements as a sort of 
exoskeleton: Setting Goals; Interpreting Facts; Interpreting Rules; and 
Managing Interactions.22 
Thus each of the first four sections of the article begins by envisioning a slice 
of what students are working on for the client problem. For each Lawyering 
Element the piece then moves in two parts:
 1.  First, I use the Lawyering Element comparatively literally. That is, to 
consider what this class segment requires the student-lawyers to do, and 
through that work, what students learn about that element. For each 
illustrative vignette, this section seeks to elucidate and deconstruct what 
the students are doing/learning through their work.
 2.  Next, in light of each vignette, I use the Lawyering Element more 
conceptually (and, to be honest, far more loosely) as a vantage point 
for small portions of faculty reflection about the student learning 
experience. 
To summarize, I ask in turn: What are Goals for this class, and also overall 
goals for educating lawyers? What do the Facts tell us about what we believe 
developing lawyers must learn, the current realities of legal pedagogy, and the 
limitations of time and built-in incentives in law teaching? What are the core 
Rules of family law, and of the social/cultural constructions of family that 
students encountering the subject must come away comprehending? Also, 
what are the internal and external rules that govern current legal pedagogy, 
what policies and assumptions underlie them, and ideally how should they 
affect our pedagogy going forward? And finally, what are the nuts and bolts 
of how we Manage Interactions among clients, colleagues, and students, for 
courses like these? What are the logistics of who does what in the course? 
And in a world of limited resources and debates about directions for legal 
education more generally, what are the ramifications for more widespread use 
of immersive methodologies? 
II. Setting Goals 
Student A: So, here’s one issue we all seem to be agreed 
upon: We’re going to recommend that we represent only 
Frankie, not Frankie and Saanvi together. Even if it’s 
technically ethical, it seems like there’s too much potential for 
conflict of interest, especially with what we know about their 
different finances.
22. I adopt this framework because it is uncomplicated, well-considered, and comparatively 
indisputable. But its ease can also be misleading: Many of these elements bleed into one 
another far more than this list implies. That can be seen throughout this article, where part 
of what I consider as “facts” might also be examined through the lens of “goals,” and so 
forth. But however imperfect or loosely metaphorical a structure it provides, having some 
form of external organization principle is far more useful than having none.
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Student B: That makes sense.
Student C: Yeah, I agree.
Student A: So if that’s the case, we still need to clarify what 
we know and maybe do research to find out more about what 
we want to advise Frankie to do in terms of her relationship 
with Saanvi.
Student B: But how much research do we really want to 
bill Frankie for if it’s simplest and safest for them just to get 
married? My bet is that that’s what they’ll end up doing 
anyway. 
Student C: Fair enough, but we know that Frankie is still 
pretty ambivalent about getting married. Shouldn’t we at 
least find out more about the kinds of documents they’d 
need to get close to the protections they would have from 
marriage? At the same time, we also know that it’s more 
expensive and time-consuming and might not provide the 
same protections in the long run . . . .
Student A (interrupting): Does anyone know what those 
documents are or how close they get you? I know I don’t, and 
we are going to have to spend some time looking into it.
Student B: My sense is that that’s Frankie’s decision, not 
ours. Let’s present her with the various options and see 
which one she goes for.
Student A: And there’s the added complication if they do 
end up having children, which she has mentioned to us more 
than once. We have to present Frankie with two scenarios 
here. One with kids and the other without.
Student C: So really one decision leads to the next 
decision leads to the next. We are going to have to 
help walk her through all of them, kind of like a flow 
chart. 
Student A: That makes sense. So let’s make a list of 
all the research we need to do and start to divide up 
the tasks.
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A. Students/Lawyers: Understanding their Roles and Goals
So far, so good. Our student-lawyers seem to understand that they cannot 
begin their work without a plan, and they seem roughly to have formulated 
one. They have actually accomplished quite a complicated array of lawyering 
tasks pretty efficiently, so it will be helpful to unpack them.23
The student-lawyers’ first objective was to determine whom to represent. 
This predicate question raises immediate issues of professional ethics, values, 
and interests.24 To reach the conclusion they do, the students must have read 
Rule 1.7 on conflicts of interest25 and they should have considered commentary 
from family law practitioners about collective vs. individual representation.26 
They had to weigh the possibility of diverging interests between their proposed 
clients Frankie and Saanvi against the added inconvenience and expense for 
the couple of having each party represented separately. 
The students’ choice to represent only Frankie is probably a wise one, and it 
will merit further exploration in class. Both partners may have complementary 
goals for the moment, but there is no guarantee that that will always remain 
true: Families are complicated, and on any number of issues what’s good 
for one partner may not remain equally advantageous for the other. It is not 
uncommon, though, for couples in the giddy throes of romance to have a 
difficult time envisioning a future that includes familial conflict, which is 
precisely why it is part of the family lawyer’s job to introduce the possibility.27 
Already, our student-lawyers are confronting the extent to which sensitive and 
very emotional factors intersect with doctrinal ones in family law—perhaps not 
entirely distinct from the way similar questions arise in other areas of law, but 
unusually pervasively and prominently in family representation.28 
23. Though the examination that follows just scratches the surface. 
24. Thus also immediately intertwining the ethical and professional exploration with doctrinal 
learning.
25. Model Rules of Professional Conflict, Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: Current Clients, americaN bar associatioN, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/
model_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_1_7_conflict_of_interest_current_clients/.
26. See Nancy R. Schembri, Prenuptial Agreements and the Significance of Independent Counsel, 17 J. 
civ. rts. & ecoN. dev. 313 (2003); see also Steven H. Hobbs, Family Matters: Non-Waivable 
Conflicts of Interest in Family Law, 22 seattle U. l. rev. 57 (1998) (considering matters in which 
representation cannot or should not be joint). But cf. Elizabeth R. Carter, Rethinking Premarital 
Agreements: A Collaborative Approach, 46 N.m. l. rev. 354 (2016) (arguing forcefully in favor of 
collaborative premarital contracts in which intended spouses retain shared counsel).
27. See Christine Fletcher, 10 Things You Need to Know About Prenups, forbes (Sept. 18, 2018), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/christinefletcher/2018/09/18/10-things-you-need-to-know-about-
prenups/#2118bc9662ba (urging readers to “hope for the best, but plan for the worst”).
28. A point frequently made in casebook-driven family law courses as well. See, e.g., doUglas 
e. abrams, Naomi r. cahN, catheriNe J. ross, david d. meYer & liNda c. mcclaiN, 
coNtemPorarY familY law 3 (4th ed. 2015) (pointing out to family law students that the 
subject is “rich in human challenges and emotions”). But perhaps not quite so viscerally 
encountered by its students?
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With the matter of whom they will represent resolved, our student-lawyers 
move onto their client’s primary presenting questions: What are the legal 
consequences if she weds her partner, and what legal protections could her 
family avail itself of if they choose not to marry? To consider the dimensions of 
these questions, the student-lawyers will have to work on “goal-setting” both 
with respect to clarifying the client’s objectives and to their own work plans. 
Let’s briefly consider each in turn.
From the short dialogue excerpted in our vignette, it is not immediately 
apparent exactly what the client’s goals are. We know she is undecided about 
getting married (do we really know why? does she?).29 Is she seeking legal 
information to guide her in making what is ultimately an intensely personal 
decision? Is one of the partners more inclined toward marriage than the 
other and hoping that legal counsel will be persuasive in a given direction? 
Or is this perhaps instead a purely pragmatic inquiry for Frankie, to figure 
out from a legal perspective exactly what benefits, privileges, and obligations 
marriage transmits so she can make a more informed decision?30 How does the 
possibility of introducing a child into the family factor in? To put a finer point 
on it, is the client’s goal purely gathering information from her lawyers, or 
does she want guidance and possibly additional legal work in order to secure 
the maximum possible legal protection for herself and her family? 
At this point, the student-lawyers do not necessarily know the answers 
to those questions,31 but already they know enough to begin to think about 
them. It is suggestive that Frankie is asking these questions of an attorney 
in the first place. After all, how frequent is it that a key step for long-term 
committed partners deciding whether to marry involves extended consultation 
with lawyers? The students may conclude that this decision by the client is a 
simulation artificiality introduced to provide an opportunity for them to 
explore the question: why legal marriage? I would nevertheless invite them to 
respond realistically to everything in their simulation,32 and to try to use the 
29. This is one of the places where Davis and Davenport’s insightful decision to set the 
simulation in the context especially pays off. In theory, any couple could be asking such 
questions about whether they would or should get married. Yet it makes far more sense for a 
lesbian couple living in a time when same-sex marriage has only recently become universally 
available in the United States to be unusually thoughtful about marriage’s ramifications.
30. Analyzing the impact of the Defense of Marriage Act’s prohibiting federal recognition 
of same-sex marriages, the Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) identified 1138 
statutory provisions in the United States Code that accorded rights and privileges on the 
basis of marital status. Defense of Marriage Act: Update to the 1997 Report—2004, UNited states 
geNeral accoUNtiNg office (Jan. 23, 2004), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.
pdf.
31. It may be that Frankie is not fully certain herself.
32. My practice in simulation teaching is never to change what “clients” (often outside 
volunteers or paid actors) say or do, but instead to try to find a way to understand their 
conduct as part of their characters. Students sometimes comment on the effectiveness of 
those “playing” their clients, which usually prompts me to look slightly puzzled and profess 
not to be acquainted with the word “actor.” But even this fairly rigid approach to realism 
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oddness of the circumstances to complicate or sharpen their understanding of 
their client’s goals. Here that query could lead the students to be somewhat 
skeptical of their client’s actual desire for marriage. It could also lead to an 
examination of the client’s specific social context. Her lawyers know that 
she has come of age in a world where legal marriage was not an available 
option for her relationship.33 They might be prompted to want to learn more 
about Frankie’s hesitancy and whether the recent(ish) legalization of same-sex 
marriage has some personal, familial, or cultural implications for Frankie that 
they are not fully aware of.34 That inquiry in turn might be helpful in aiding 
Frankie to further clarify and then meet her goals in consulting her attorneys.
Notice, then, that on the client’s behalf our student-lawyers’ careful 
attention to her goals neatly epitomizes the description of the goal-setting 
element as elucidated in the Lawyering Method, which affirms that lawyers 
“must hear or propose explicit goals, identify implicit goals, and balance both 
against judgments about the [client’s] interests . . . .”35 
Notice, too, that the vignette leaves off at exactly the point where the 
student-lawyers begin to establish goals for their own work on this portion of 
the case. Presumably, in the next segment of their conversation, the student-
lawyers will distill what they need to find out, and then they will begin their 
research. The effectiveness of that research can be evaluated in the next section 
of the course when the students will meet with Frankie to review her options. 
And both the efficacy and efficiency of the research goals and paths will be 
subject to critical examination, consistent with immersion methodology.36
still leaves room for faculty intervention when needed. We can always use in-role devices like 
faculty-drafted emails from clients, etc. to add or correct facts that are crucial to the students’ 
progress in the case. 
33. A history which led to a great deal of confusion about the legal status of pre-Obergefell same-
sex relationships. See Michael J. Higdon, While They Waited: Pre-Obergefell Lives and the Law of 
Nonmarriage, 129 Yale l.J. forUm 1 (2019). 
34. As the students will learn, Frankie is, in fact, experiencing a good deal of resistance to the 
“institutionalizing” of her relationship. Some of it stems from feminist critique of marriage 
itself, and some from an unwillingness to grant what has traditionally been a hostile state 
the power to define the private relationship she cherishes. For background underlying such 
considerations, see Paula Ettelbrick, Since when is marriage a path to liberation?, 6 Out/
Look 14, (1989); Katherine M. Franke, Marriage Is a Mixed Blessing, NY Times (June 23, 
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/opinion/24franke.html?mtrref=www.google.
com&gwh=0B7DB08E40BF752B6DCF9FA9D119DC7F&gwt. 
35. Experiential Learning Lab, supra note 21.
36. One of the benefits of an experiential immersion course is that researchers can pretty easily 
identify the successes and breakdowns in their research goals when they turn to use what 
they have found. In addition to evaluating their efficacy in setting their research goals, I 
further ask students to look critically at their own efficiency in finding the information they 
sought. Repeating those two lines of critique—completeness and time investment—for all 
research work in the course helps delineate for students what the broad goals of research 
should always be. It also helps them teach themselves to refine their research paths within 
family law-specific material. 
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Having identified several possible client objectives and determined that they 
will treat them essentially as options along a decision tree that they will present 
when they next meet with their client, our student-lawyers begin to enumerate 
their research tasks. The student-lawyers’ “flowchart” idea is a rather astute 
plan. It shows a genuinely sophisticated understanding of the counseling 
work they are preparing for, in that they seem to grasp the contingent nature of 
client decision-making.37 The students also seem intuitively to discern that they 
can best help their client make a decision about marriage—her stated primary 
goal—by outlining both best- and worst-case protections for the client’s family 
in marital and nonmarital scenarios.38 That perception in turn branches 
into their plans for further investigation of the kinds of private documents 
attorneys can provide to their clients to afford at least some of the protections 
automatically conferred by marriage.39 
Family law practitioners and professors would further be pleased to see that 
these students immediately comprehend how much the decision of whether 
or not to marry changes with the possibility of children. This is true both 
because the issues become more complicated40 and the stakes may become 
so much higher.41 Most practitioners would probably also be delighted to 
have their junior lawyers be at least passingly aware of billing matters and 
proportionality in regard to legal work.
So our vignette suggests that the students have a lot on their plates even 
in this beginning stage of the simulation. But so far they do seem eager and 
equipped to handle it.
37. See Alexander Scherr, Lawyers and Decisions: A Model of Practical Judgment, 47 vill. l. rev. 161, 
265–69 (2002) (considering the professional anxiety lawyers may experience from the 
limitations of their advisory roles, and “not having the final say in legal decisions” that they 
must, in the end, leave up to their clients).
38. Meaning that they will have to look closely at questions of who can marry whom and by what 
means, as well as what marriage permits and what it requires. This should lead them next 
to study such issues as financial support obligations within marriage, property ownership 
status, healthcare access and determination, and legal expectations (or not) of fidelity. 
39.  Meaning that they will have to learn something about common estate-planning instruments 
such as powers of attorney, health proxies, and designations of conservatorship.
40. Particularly given the biological reality that in the lesbian client’s scenario no child will 
be the direct biological descendant of both parents, which inevitably raises a host of legal 
issues pertaining either to assisted reproduction or to adoption. See Elizabeth A. Harris, 
Same-Sex Parents Still Face Legal Complications, N.Y. times (June 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/06/20/us/gay-pride-lgbtq-same-sex-parents.html.
41. Kris Franklin, “A Family Like Any Other Family:” Alternative Methods of Defining Family in Law, 18 
N.Y.U. rev. l. & soc. chaNge 1027, 1073–76 (1990–91) (considering nontraditional means of 
providing legal recognition for familial ties, and concluding that workable schemes were far 
more straightforward to construct for relations among adults than between adults and their 
children).
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B. Professors/Case Supervisors: Establishing Achievable Goals for Integrated Learning
What are the educational goals of this introductory segment of the 
immersion family law course? 
Well, first, to learn some family law.42 
In all of our immersive family law courses this means developing a core 
understanding of the rules of law pertaining to the clients’ problems. Since 
my course is intended as an introduction to family equivalent to a more 
traditionally taught casebook course, it additionally means that the legal 
principles studied should be consistent with those usually learned in any 
standard family law class. In an immersion class, though, we do mean “learn 
law” far more multidimensionally than may be true in traditional casebook 
courses. Yet we firmly believe that students also leave the class with at least as 
solid an understanding of the legal principles they have studied as they would 
have gained in a casebook-driven class.
For this proposition we can turn to the reflections on experiential learning 
that abound in the legal pedagogy literature.43 To support the notion that 
learning by doing helps students master fundamental concepts we can turn 
to other scholars’ examinations of the embedded learning in other disciplines: 
Bob Moses’ concretized teaching of positive and negative numbers by 
riding public transit, for example,44 or Aaron Pallas’ introduction to statistics 
methodology through group exploration of what it truly means for a number 
to be in the “middle” of a dataset.45 
This kind of learning embodies what educational theorist Eleanor 
Duckworth deems “critical exploration.”46 Duckworth’s own research is 
centered in primary education, and she grounds her theories in the earlier 
thinking of Jean Piaget and Bärbel Inhelder.47 Through examples of puzzles 
and projects that enable children to explore science, mathematics, spelling, 
and other basic educational topics, though, her work is universalized beyond 
42. Because at least my own version of Family Law in Practice is intended to be a reasonably 
comprehensive survey of common family law doctrine, I will have to ensure that students 
encounter in broad strokes most of the topics generally introduced in a basic family law 
course. Discussed infra at text accompanying fn. 57-62. 
43. See Jennifer E. Spreng, Spirals and Schemas: How Integrated Courses in Law Schools Create Higher-Order 
Thinkers and Problem Solvers, 37 U. la verNe l. rev. 37, 43–50 (2015).
44. Detailed at length in robert P. moses & charles e. cobb, Jr., radical eqUatioNs: civil 
rights from mississiPPi to the algebra ProJect (2002). 
45. aaroN m. Pallas & aNNa NeUmaNN, coNvergeNt teachiNg: tools to sPark deePer 
learNiNg iN college 69–77 (2019) [hereinafter coNvergeNt teachiNg]. For further 
examples, see Mary Kay Delany’s introduction to epistemology in high school social studies 
through examination of policies and perceptions of President Ronald Reagan. Understanding 
the Presidency, in “tell me more”: listeNiNg to learNers exPlaiN 125 (Eleanor Duckworth 
ed., 1987).
46. eleaNor dUckworth, “the haviNg of woNderfUl ideas” aNd other essaYs oN teachiNg 
aNd learNiNg 140 (3d ed. 2006).
47. Id. at 1–5, 15–16, 38–40.
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child development. Moreover, it neatly anticipates the kinds of learning 
that adult law students do in immersion courses. As Duckworth relates, she 
is “convinced that people must construct their own knowledge and must 
assimilate new experiences in ways that make sense to them . . . . [M]ore often 
than not, simply telling students what we want them to know leaves them 
cold.”48 Duckworth’s observation helps make it clear exactly why immersion—
designed learning by doing—permits “learning law” much more meaningfully 
than casebook courses typically foster. The student-lawyers’ empathy for 
their clients, and simultaneous interest in their own experience working on 
the problems the clients present, give abstract operation of legal rules real 
context in precisely the way that Socratic hypotheticals aim for49 but too rarely 
achieve.50 
Current learning theory may provide additional explanation for the 
unique value of immersive learning: It is frankly more complicated and more 
challenging. Scholars can debate the merits of complexity at various points 
in educational curricula (they have!),51 but there is little doubt that if we want 
to teach complicated things (we do!)52 at some point or other we will need 
to teach things in a way that is . . . complicated. With respect to retention of 
material learned,53 psychologists even have a name for the effect of what they 
call “desirable difficulty.”54 We know that the harder human brains work to 
retrieve information the more strongly it is stored, and the more effortlessly 
it is retrieved later on.55 It accordingly makes sense that so-called “effortful” 
48. Id. at 173.
49. For a thoughtful endorsement of the continuing value of well-considered Socratic case 
dialogue, see Michael T. Gibson, A Critique of Best Practices in Legal Education: Five Things All Law 
Professors Should Know, 42 U. balt. l. rev. 1, 30–61 (2012).
50. Especially for all students equally. The nature of Socratic dialogue as it usually functions 
in the casebook law classroom tends to involve a solitary interlocutor conversing with one 
or only a very few students at a time. In theory, all other students/observers are thoroughly 
engaged in critically considering both sides of this discourse, but it seems doubtful that 
those who are not part of the exchange remain attentively and fully engrossed at every 
moment. Jeremiah A. Ho, Function, Form, and Strawberries: Subverting Langdell, 64 J. legal edUc. 
656, 658–70 (2015).
51. See comPlexitY iN edUcatioN: from horror to PassioN (Cok Bakker & Nicolina 
Montesano Montessori eds., 2016).
52. All law teachers must impart deep knowledge of intricate legal rules and exceptions, all 
while we are concurrently and always aiming to further refine the ineffable complexities of 
“thinking like a lawyer.”
53. Which differs from initial mastery of concepts and skills, but is of course closely adjacent.
54. Robert A. Bjork & Elizabeth Ligon Bjork, A New Theory of Disuse and an Old Theory of Stimulus 
Fluctuation, in from learNiNg Processes to cogNitive Processes: essaYs iN hoNor of 
william k. estes, volUme 2 35 (Alice F. Healy et al. eds., 1992).
55. See generally Peter c. browN et. al., make it stick: the scieNce of sUccessfUl learNiNg 
67–101 (2014) (urging that for greater learning we should “embrace difficulties” and that 
“easier isn’t better”).
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learning has been found to be less superficial and more long-lasting.56 So if 
learning of legal doctrine takes place in an immersive setting, and the immersion 
experience is more demanding, the body of current learning science should 
suggest at the very least that mastery of the rules should be more complete and 
more long-lasting. 
Some may wonder whether learning legal rules by immersion actually is 
harder than learning them in casebook courses.57 When it comes to the kind of 
curated experiences fictionalized in simulations, writers have suggested that 
they tend to be “simpler”58 or at least insufficiently “messy.”59 I do not agree 
that simulations by their very nature must be comparatively uncomplicated.60 
Quite the contrary, in fact, in the sense that they bring together so many 
dimensions of what we mean by “law.” And when considering only the narrow 
category of learning established black-letter rules, it is hard to see how there 
can be substantial variation in difficulty whether those rules are learned in 
practical context as compared with a more traditional case reading. 
But even though learning legal doctrine is absolutely central to the 
overarching goal to “learn some family law,” what we mean by that is also more 
ambitious than just mastery of statutes, cases, or concepts. Legal doctrine 
does not exist for its own sake—it is developed in the context of real human 
problems. Understanding how the law operates for the people who encounter 
it is part of truly comprehending what it is, and why it is that way. That’s 
how law students and lawyers move from “knowing” the law (being able to 
56. Elizabeth Ligon Bjork & Robert A. Bjork, Making Things Hard on Yourself, But in a Good Way: 
Creating Desirable Difficulties to Enhance Learning, in PsYchologY aNd the real world: essaYs 
illUstratiNg fUNdameNtal coNtribUtioNs to societY 56 (Morton Ann Gernsbacher et 
al. eds., 2009)
57. And I suppose some might suggest that the stress of traditional cold-calling in many 
casebook-driven law classes is itself difficult. I’m quite sure it is, but I doubt that is precisely 
the kind of difficulty that the researchers had in mind for enhancing comprehension and 
recall.
58. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Simulations: An Introduction, 45 J. legal edUc. 469, 470 (1995) 
(characterizing simulations as “more complex than doctrinal hypos, but lacking the intense 
reality of a live-client experience”); Katherine R. Kruse, Legal Education and Professional Skills: 
Myths and Misconceptions about Theory and Practice, 45 mcgeorge l. rev. 7, 32 (2013) [hereinafter 
Myths and Misconceptions] (contending that “[s]imulations necessarily simplify the factual 
and interpersonal complexity of actual lawyering”); see also Margaret Moore Jackson, From 
Seminar to Simulation: Wading Out to the Third Wave, 19 J. geNder race & JUst. 127, 138–39 (2016) 
(describing “what simulation teaching may do less well”).
59. Comments attributed to Dean Erwin Chemerinsky of UC Irvine, quoted in No More Casebooks, 
supra note 10, at 706.
60. It certainly helps in creating rich and deeply realistically complex characters and situations 
to have the unique contributions of a talented playwright like Danielle Davenport. Legal 
educators could probably gain a lot from more widespread cross-pollination with creative 
disciplines. Yet as enormously valuable as Davenport’s collaboration was for our immersion 
courses, I do not think finding nonlegal contributors is a sine qua non, and the absence of 
such a collaborator should not be a barrier to immersion for law professors working on their 
own.
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recap legal principles) to thoroughly knowing it (having thought deeply enough 
about legal principles to exercise good judgment about when they apply and 
predict how they might shift in new circumstances).
Moreover, immersion teachers and our students include within the “learning 
law” umbrella a family-law-specific examination of client interviewing, 
counseling, research, advocacy, ethical questions and values inquiries, along 
with the rest of the extended list of the professional undertakings of lawyers. In 
so doing, we also take on the many goals of experiential education enumerated 
by Deborah Maranville and her colleagues: understanding unequal social 
structures, advancing social justice, developing lawyering skills, cultivating 
professional identity, fostering professional ethics, providing culturally 
competent client representation to a diverse array of clients, developing sound 
judgment and problem-solving abilities, gaining insight into law and the legal 
system, promoting lifelong learning, and learning to work collaboratively.61 
In short, our goal of learning law is as expansive as the meaning of the word 
itself.
One immediate example is the student-lawyers’ insight into the “flowchart 
nature” of their impending client counseling session that I have already 
praised. An overarching goal of legal education is helping law students 
understand and develop skills for their role in helping clients solve problems.62 
The progressive nature of the various decisions their client will have to make 
and the information she needs to make her choices almost force the student-
lawyers to become more thoughtful about the interrelationship between legal 
information and client decision-making. One goal down, and certainly plenty 
of other examples can be found.
Once we have established “learning some family law” in an intricate and 
multifaceted way as our encompassing teaching objective, it may be helpful 
to consider some of the logistical details involved in trying to meet those 
objectives.
We find that many of our approaches are consistent with those outlined by 
other law teachers reflecting on their simulation-based coursework, so there is 
no need to rehash what has been amply communicated by so many colleagues. 
Instead, then, I outline here several of the operational decisions that seem 
not to have been adopted by others, or are at least not fleshed out in other 
published works.
61. Deborah Maranville, Mary A. Lynch, Susan L. Kay, Phyllis Goldfarb & Russell Engler, Re-
Vision Quest: A Law School Guide to Designing Experiential Courses Involving Real Lawyering, 56 N.Y. l. 
sch. l. rev. 517, 527 (Jan. 2012).
62. A prodigious volume of writing directed at law students, and about the profession generally, 
focuses on the modern attorney’s primary responsibility to serve as a “problem solver” for 
clients. For just one prominent example, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Winning Isn’t 
Everything: The Lawyer as Problem Solver, 28 hofstra l. rev. 905 (2000). Perhaps this also 
explains the common law school graduation gift of a mug emblazoned with Lawyer: Because 
Badass Problem Solver is not an Official Job Title.
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The first is the strategic use of structured team-based research assignments. 
In my course, students organize themselves into teams of three or at most 
four student-lawyers, and once the teams are formed they are chunked into 
groupings designated A, B, and C.63 It is not unusual in experiential law 
classes to have students work in teams (often dubbed “law firms”64). And there 
are tremendous advantages to learning in teams,65 not the least of which is 
that knowing how to work collaboratively has frequently been identified as a 
crucial skill within the legal profession and beyond.66 
An innovation in our immersion classes is to use the differing letter 
designations to manage workload and to more comprehensively exemplify the 
kinds of inquiries expected of attorneys by frequently posing differing—albeit 
occasionally overlapping—research preparation assignments to differently 
lettered teams. For example, after meeting the client and planning their work 
as shown in our vignette, my own students would begin with some background 
reading that the partner in their firm would provide (e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges67) 
and would then consider a more focused question depending on their team’s 
designation, such as: 
 A.  Who is eligible to be married in our state, and what procedures does 
the jurisdiction require? 
 B.  Does our state recognize domestic partnerships, and if so, how are they 
similar to or dissimilar from legal marriage? 
63. The idea of dividing teams into groupings and assigning differing preparations emphases 
was originated by Peggy Cooper Davis in her version of the course. My specific research 
assignments and focuses diverge from hers because of the differing nature of our courses, 
but I was happy to adopt her effective and efficient approach.
64. E.g., No More Casebooks, supra note 10, at 702. Forming student working groups called law 
firms is a pretty widespread practice in many classrooms. See, e.g., Robert G. Vaughn, Use 
of Simulations in a First-Year Civil Procedure Class, 45 J. legal edUc. 480, 481 (1995); Lloyd B. 
Snyder, Teaching Students How to Practice Law: A Simulation Course in Pretrial Practice, 45 J. legal 
edUc. 513, 515 (1995). 
65. In fact, there are well-developed theories of best practices for team-based learning that have 
been employed in other disciplines for decades, and used effectively in law classrooms for 
some time. See Sophie M. Sparrow & Margaret Sova McCabe, Team-Based Learning in Law, 18 
J. legal writiNg iNst. 153 (2012). Since it has a different structure and design, I cannot 
claim that my course fully follows all of the systems identified as components for effective 
“team-based learning.” Perhaps, then, that designation does not fully fit the pedagogy of my 
class. Nonetheless, our objectives and procedures are similar (and I hope complementary), 
so whether or not Family Law in Practice is considered a “team-based learning course,” it 
is certain that there is significant learning both within and about functioning professional 
teams.
66. See roY stUckeY, best Practices for legal edUcatioN: a visioN aNd a roadmaP 77 
(2007); Sophie M. Sparrow, Can They Work Well on a Team? Assessing Students’ Collaborative Skills, 
38 wm. mitchell l. rev. 1162, 1162–64 (2012) (considering the strong desire in the legal 
profession for law graduates who are well prepared to function as effective team members). 
67. 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
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 C.  What is common-law marriage, does our state recognize it, and is there 
any possibility our client already has one? 
In class meetings, student teams can report on their own research, ensure 
that their findings and analysis were consistent with those of other teams 
sharing their letter designation, and ask questions of groups that focused on 
other areas. Divvying up the questions this way serves one faculty goal of 
ensuring that all of these topics are considered, and another faculty goal of 
exposing all students to many topics without ending up spending too much 
time on any one of them.68 Since several teams share the same letter designation 
and therefore the same assignments they can compare their work with others’, 
so that collectively the class has achieved some specialization, coverage, and 
contrast for self-critique, all without unhelpful duplication of student effort.
Yet another difference from most casebook courses (and many clinical ones) 
is my insistence that students reflect explicitly and critically on their research 
paths. Self-reflection is quite naturally a key component of any immersive 
learning. It may be the singular hallmark of what law professors consider 
“clinical method.”69 It is, therefore, frequent in clinical education that students 
are asked to be thoughtfully reflective about their lawyering interactions such 
as meetings with clients or witnesses, their appearances in court or at hearings, 
and so on. But there are fewer opportunities in law school for budding lawyers 
to turn their attention directly to surveying and improving their own research 
work and learning processes. That’s a shame. An entire body of literature on 
the value of metacognition suggests that the more students are conscious of 
how they are learning, the more effective learners they will become.70
III. Interpreting Facts
Student B: That was a really productive meeting with 
Frankie!
Student C: Yeah, I feel like we have a much clearer direction 
to go in now.
Student A (jumping in): Sure, we have a better sense of 
68. Even though this example does not show it, it is common for one of the preassigned 
questions to be about lawyering process, such as “How should an excellent attorney conduct 
this initial client meeting?” That meets the dual goals of creating an opportunity to be 
explicit in learning/reviewing key lawyering skills, and of making that project seem equal in 
significance to learning about the legal rules governing the problem. It is my habit to rotate 
letter assignments so that the more process-oriented questions move around to differently 
designated teams.
69. sUsaN brYaNt et al., traNsformiNg the edUcatioN of lawYers: the theorY aNd 
Practice of cliNical PedagogY 23–24 (2014) [hereinafter cliNical PedagogY].
70.  See generally how PeoPle learN: braiN, miNd, exPerieNce, aNd school 47–48 (John D. 
Bransford et al., eds., 2000); michael hUNter schwartz & PaUla J. maNNiNg, exPert 
learNiNg for law stUdeNts (3d ed. 2018) (applying metacognitive techniques to law 
student learning). 
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what our tasks are and what she is saying she would want. 
I mean, obviously we’re going to need to know a lot more 
about property ownership, mortgages, taxes, and so on. But 
did anyone else feel like Frankie wasn’t being super-realistic 
about the financial considerations in their relationship? 
It seemed to me Frankie had a hard time acknowledging 
quite how dependent their lives are on Saanvi’s income and 
assets, which are so much greater than hers.
Student C: That’s true. I think she doesn’t think about—or 
doesn’t want to think about—how much their comparative 
finances have changed. She was fine sharing expenses 
early in their relationship when she had more money but 
neither of them had very much, but now that Saanvi has a 
lot of money it seems like she is more reluctant to consider 
everything they have as joint.
Student B: I actually really admire Frankie for wanting 
to feel like Saanvi’s financial equal, but it’s scaring me in 
terms of writing a prenup. 
Student A: Yes. I am certainly glad we’re the ones writing 
the first draft, not Saanvi’s lawyers! But I feel pretty torn 
here between our obligations to look out for Frankie’s best 
interests and, on the other hand, to draft this document the 
way she has suggested she wants.
Student C: I know! Frankie’s not necessarily looking out for 
her own best interests.
Student A: Do you think she was thinking aloud, or that she 
definitely meant what she said about all of the stuff that’s in 
Saanvi’s name staying that way? My sense is that without a 
premarital agreement, if they were to get divorced somewhere 
down the line Frankie would be entitled to a lot more. I don’t 
think she has really thought through what it would be like if 
they ever broke up.
Student C: We’d have to know a lot more about what a 
divorce would look like in our state without a prenup, and 
how stuff would get divided, before we can think through the 
options and terms we should present to Frankie.
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Student B: By the way, have either of you drafted a prenup 
before? I know I haven’t, and I don’t really know where to 
start.
A. Students/Lawyers: Defining Facts Needed to Complete a Task
From this new vignette, it is apparent that our student-lawyers are now 
presented with a clearly defined lawyering task. We learn that they are preparing 
to draft a prenuptial agreement, which suggests that the client has decided 
to legally marry.71 The vignette also establishes that the partners, probably 
acting wisely upon advice of counsel, plan to consider ways to address some 
significant differences in their assets and income before they wed. 
The next steps for the student-lawyers would seem to be:
 1.  Finding out as much as possible about both Frankie’s and Saanvi’s 
current earnings and property;
 2.  Learning more about both partners’ careers, investments, and family 
backgrounds, so that to the extent possible their individual and joint 
assets can be projected to the future;
 3.  Gathering information about wealth- and estate-planning, including 
how federal and state taxation would treat the family currently and 
whether there are more advantageous ways for them to structure their 
money;
 4.  Familiarizing themselves with the marital property dissolution scheme 
in their state to contrast it with whatever premarital agreement(s) might 
be on the table;
 5.  Drafting a prenuptial contract that would protect Frankie’s economic 
interests in the case of a divorce; and finally,
 6.  Presenting that draft agreement (or perhaps several alternative 
approaches to a possible agreement) to Frankie in a meeting in which 
the attorneys explain their concerns about her financial security and 
then seek to implement her decisions.
Steps 3 and 4 fall squarely within the category of understanding and using 
legal rules, step 6 pretty clearly involves a great deal of “managing interactions,” 
and step 5 probably combines the two. This segment of the article concerns 
itself primarily with the fact-gathering required to begin the work at hand.
So exactly what facts do the student-lawyers need to perform their work, and 
how will they get them? Legal work is always intensely fact-bound, but in what 
ways—and where those facts come from—can differ enormously.72  Advocacy 
71. Lawyers for Frankie should at least consider the outside possibility that both the client and 
her partner could be using the term “prenuptial” colloquially, and that they are seeking a 
relationship contract but have no immediate plans to legally wed. But that seems unlikely, 
and it is probably safe to assume that Frankie and Saanvi want to get married.
72. See W. Bradley Wendel, Whose Truth? Objective and Subjective Perspectives on Truthfulness in Advocacy, 
28 Yale J.l. & hUm. 105 (2015).
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settings, for example, pose the unique complexity of necessitating both the 
most objective read available and the ultimate need for creative structuring 
of the most favorable slant possible in the circumstances.73 For less-contested 
legal work74 like the planning documents sought here, the assembling of facts 
may be more linear, but it is never effortless. Because the matters we handle 
are always personally consequential, lawyers must work tirelessly to collect as 
much information about their clients’ circumstances as they can.75
For crafting a prenuptial contract, the facts our family lawyers need to work 
with will almost all be based within their client’s financial realities.76 Personal 
issues are hard. And money questions are especially personal, therefore 
especially hard to talk about. We learn in the vignette that the student-lawyers 
have discovered there is a considerable disparity between their clients’ fortune 
and her partner’s—as well as, apparently, some touchiness around her feelings 
of dependency. This could make the fact-gathering required in this situation 
unusually thorny. The student-lawyers will have to be thoughtful about what 
information they need and where they will get it, as well as being careful about 
how they deliver their inquiries.
Their first steps should be to go beyond the descriptive information 
available from conversations with their client and to seek to review as much 
documentary evidence as they can reasonably77 obtain. That can provide 
more concrete and indisputable information than would be obtained orally, 
while simultaneously helping to circumvent the awkwardness of asking some 
questions in person. They may want to ask for bank statements, copies of W-2s 
or tax returns, mortgage papers, and so on. 
What’s particularly complicated is that it would be very helpful to see such 
materials for both Frankie and Saanvi. Yet not only is Saanvi not their client, 
she is represented by separate counsel. The student-lawyers now have both 
a client to gather information from78 and someone who is essentially a third 
73. As the Lawyering Elements explain, interpreting facts is rarely a simple matter, “for facts are 
rarely certain and always subject to varying interpretations.” exPerieNtial learNiNg lab, 
supra note 21; see also § 13.4 Developing a Unifying Theme in stefaN h. krieger & richard k. 
NeUmaNN, Jr., esseNtial lawYeriNg skills 174–83 (4th ed. 2011 but probably not the most 
recent).
74. One important distinction between legal counsel and advice from other kinds of professionals 
is that lawyers are trained to always operate within the shadow of potential litigation. Even 
in purely transactional work, lawyers are often taught to anticipate and mitigate risk in the 
eventuality of partnerships not working out. See stePheN l. sePiNUck & JohN fraNcis 
hilsoN, traNsactioNal skills: how to strUctUre aNd docUmeNt a deal 6–11 (2015).
75. As Mary Pat Treuthart exemplifies, teachers of family law courses routinely emphasize “the 
importance of listening, really listening, to what the client is saying, and not saying.” A 
Perspective on Teaching and Learning Family Law, 75 UMKC L. rev. 1047, 1051 (2007).
76. garY N. skoloff et al., draftiNg PreNUPtial agreemeNts (2019 supp.).
77. “Reasonable” meaning without being too intrusive and without incurring unwarranted 
attorneys’ fees in the process.
78. Susan L. Turley contends that lawyers should always see interviewing clients (and others) 
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party (at least to their representation)79 that they need to consult with—all while 
respecting that in seeking the information they need, they are wading into 
private matters between life partners. The attorneys will have to be savvy 
about assessing their priorities, and then they’ll need to decide from whom 
and how they should ask for those materials.80 
Now, assume for the moment that our student-lawyers were wildly 
successful in that project and somehow magically obtained every single piece 
of paper that they could possibly wish to get their hands on, and that they 
meticulously pored through them. Would they then have all the facts they 
needed? Hardly. At best, this would provide only a slice of the present facts. 
Even those may be unclear or subject to interpretation.81 Drafting planning 
documents like prenuptial agreements entails understanding the facts when 
the contract becomes operative—i.e., at some undetermined possible point in 
the future. Future “facts” are not actually facts, they are speculation of possible 
scenarios that may unfold. But they are also the contingencies upon which the 
legal analysis to be done now (legal reasoning being at base the application 
of rules to facts) hinges. Or, to put it differently, the efficacy of our lawyers’ 
current drafting project depends on what the facts will become. Those can be 
anticipated but cannot yet be actually known. 
For our student-lawyers, planning in this way will help solidify their grasp 
of the imaginative process that is so often a part of legal work with facts. 
Sometimes that imagination leads to creative avenues of investigation.82 
Sometimes it involves envisioning what is not currently established but might 
be true and then asking questions or collecting evidence to find out whether 
it actually is. Other times, as here, it involves wading into the vast chasm of 
uncertainty that lawyers’ greatest challenge is to manage.83 In many practice 
as a key tool of research for lawyers. I completely agree. “To See Between”: Interviewing as a Legal 
Research Tool, 7 J. ass’N legal writiNg directors 283 (2010).
79. Experts in interviewing emphasize the importance of “parallel universe” thinking when 
seeking to elicit information through conversation. See cliNical PedagogY, supra note 70, at 
258–59.
80. Raising interesting complexities in managing interactions, and thus exposing how 
interconnected and overlapping the various Lawyering Elements actually are. Supra fn. 21 
and accompanying text. 
81. aNthoNY g. amsterdam & Jerome brUNer, miNdiNg the law: how coUrt relY oN 
storYtelliNg, aNd how their stories chaNge the waYs we UNderstaNd the law – aNd 
oUrselves 7 (2000).
82.  See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and Teachable in Legal 
Education?, 6 harv. Negot. l. rev. 97 (2001). This is also undoubtedly why a law school 
text devoted to interviewing and counseling skills so heavily stresses maintaining an open 
perspective when working with clients. stePheN ellmaNN et al., lawYers aNd clieNts: 
critical issUes iN iNterviewiNg aNd coUNseliNg 16–17 (2009).
83. cliNical PedagogY, supra note 70, at 19–21 (positions “improving capacities to manage 
uncertainty” as a central component of the third goal of all legal clinical education); see also 
elizabeth mertz, the laNgUage of law school: learNiNg to “thiNk like a lawYer” 
66–67 (2007) (observing the “epistemological uncertainty” in which law students begin to 
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circumstances, treating things that are not actually factual as contingent but 
potential “facts” is a necessary component of lawyers’ thinking. Within a 
cautious profession predicated on trying to be correct, handling uncertainly is 
probably one of the hardest things new lawyers need to learn.84 Nevertheless, 
our role as counselors-at-law frequently obliges us to give the best advice we 
can even about uncertain prospects. In short, to help clients manage a never-
entirely-knowable present and a changeable future. 
Turning back to the reality that they will probably never have every single 
piece of evidence they could ever hope to obtain,85 the next key question for 
our student-lawyers will be: How will they know when they have done enough 
gathering and interpreting of facts in their case? Professors teaching students 
to conduct legal research frequently stress the need to find some ending point.86 
The difficulty of deciding that enough is enough extends equally to factual 
research. Lawyers need to become comfortable with probably overshooting 
their research targets to the point of repetition or diminishing returns just to 
ensure relative completeness, while also aiming to do so with as much economy 
of time as possible. That requires training and experience, which our student-
lawyers are happily beginning to accrue.
B. Professors/Case Supervisors: Considering the Factual Context 
for Developing and Teaching an Immersive Course
What are the “facts” of a sound legal education? That is to say, given an 
expectation of lifelong learning and refining expertise, what is it that we in the 
profession believe law graduates and new lawyers must have learned? 
Clearly, there is no single definitively accepted answer to that question, 
hence the endless debates within the academy about curriculum, skills and 
values training, or subject matter knowledge—as well as the ongoing calls for 
transformational change that the Carnegie Report87 and so many law school 
critics recommend. As has already been noted, though, we do all seem to 
reconcile into a general concurrence that practice-ready law graduates must 
understand what attorneys mean by “facts”).
84. See, for example, the extended dialogue intended to illustrate for law students the challenge 
and importance of operating in a “world full of wicked ‘whiches’” in richard michael 
fischl & JeremY PaUl, gettiNg to maYbe: how to excel oN law school exams 109–16 
(1999).
85. Really, how would they ever be able to know that for sure even if they did?
86. Major legal research texts uniformly include advice on when to keep going and at what 
point to stop. See, e.g., amY e. sloaN, basic legal research: tools aNd strategies (7th 
ed. 2018) (on “deciding when to stop”); christiNa l. kUNz et al., the Process of legal 
research 10 (8th ed. 2012) (on “stopping”).
87. Published as william m. sUllivaN et al., edUcatiNg lawYers: PreParatioN for the 
ProfessioN of law (2007) [hereinafter carNegie rePort]. Before that, related propositions 
about the need for at least some reform in legal education methods were put for the in 
the MacCrate Report. rePort of the task force oN law schools aNd the ProfessioN: 
NarrowiNg the gaP (1992). 
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have a complementary balance of a basic knowledge of legal rules, sharp 
analytical skills, and meaningful introduction to many and varied tasks 
of the profession like reading, researching, writing, advocating, speaking 
persuasively, and working effectively both with other professionals and with 
clients. 
Our vignette helps illustrate that immersive learning of legal doctrine 
embedded in context readily combines all of those components of preparing 
for a legal career.88 Our student-lawyers have not yet studied the rules that 
govern the financial decisions their client must make, but they themselves 
recognize that they must learn about “property ownership, mortgages, taxes, 
and so on,” as well as finding out about the marital property division rules 
operating in their state. Moreover, they seem to treat that legal knowledge 
in precisely the way law professors would want them to: as required baseline 
information that must then be applied to a specific factual context (that is, 
Frankie’s). 
It is not inconsequential, though, that these students have essentially assigned 
themselves the project of mastering this sometimes-dense material. A significant 
body of research shows that feelings of personal agency and autonomy can 
enhance learning.89 Further work suggests the most common learning modes 
in traditional law school classes may interfere with student autonomy and 
self-efficacy,90 while enhanced autonomy positively impacts both law student 
happiness and learning itself.91
Impressively, our student-lawyers easily blend their doctrinal questions 
with their intrapersonal ones: They know both that they must learn more 
about the areas of law they plan to research and that having that information 
will not alone be sufficient to resolve the client’s current insistence on entirely 
separating her wealth from her betrothed’s. These students’ contextual legal 
88. It even introduces the kinds of transactional planning work that some critics suggest is often 
underemphasized current legal education. For a summary of commentary on the need for 
more teaching of transactional skills in law schools, see Carol Goforth, Transactional Skills 
Training Across the Curriculum, 66 J. legal edUc. 904 (2017).
89. Allison D. Martin & Kevin L. Rand, The Future’s So Bright, I Gotta Wear Shades: Law School through 
the Lens of Hope, 48 dUq. l. rev. 203, 214–17 (2010); Carol L. Wallinger, Autonomy Support 101: 
How Using Proven Autonomy Support Techniques Can Increase Law Student Autonomy, Engender Hope, and 
Improve Outcomes, 48 dUq. l. rev. 385, 396–98 (2010). 
90. See Lawrence S. Krieger & Kennon M. Sheldon, Does Legal Education have Undermining Effects 
on Law Students? Evaluating Changes in Motivation, Values, and Well-Being, 22 behav. sch. law 261, 
262–67 (2004); see also Corie Rosen, Creating the Optimistic Classroom: What Law Schools Can Learn 
from Attribution Style Effects, 42 mcgeorge l. rev. 319, 324 (2011) (locating destabilizing effects 
of legal education across types of courses and law schools).
91. See Louis N. Schultz, Jr. & Adam A. Ding, Alternative Justifications for Academic Support III: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Academic Support and Humanizing Law Schools, 38 ohio N.U. l. rev. 
999, 1002–11 (2012) (reviewing literature supporting the positive impact of greater student 
autonomy in law schools); Paula J. Manning, Understanding the Impact of Inadequate Feedback: A 
Means to Reduce Law Student Psychological Distress, Increase Motivation, and Improve Learning Outcomes, 
43 cUmb. l. rev. 225, 229–33 (2013) (summarizing proven effects of self-determination and 
autonomy support on achievement).
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work not only helps erase the doctrine/skills divide,92 it may also enhance the 
transfer of learning from one setting to another. 
Educational theorists use the term “transfer” to describe learning that takes 
place in one context being used in another.93 Anyone who has ever taught, 
well . . . anything probably recognizes the exceeding difficulty of helping 
learners transfer prior knowledge94 to new settings, and of getting them to 
deploy it effectively. It could be argued that learning that is not transferred is 
not actually learned at all—otherwise, it would have been available for use in 
new circumstances. Researchers who study learning have found that a good 
way to increase transfer is to provide multiple opportunities for learners to 
practice applying what they are learning,95 ideally in circumstances that will 
help them see the underlying functions of the matter (its “deep structure”96) 
rather than becoming fixated on surface-level commonalities or distinctions.97 
Immersion work automatically and of necessity requires that kind of practice. 
It also pushes students toward higher-order thinking about the law at issue,98 
which likely generates the sort of deeper comprehension that is indispensable 
for transfer.
Meanwhile, in addition to considering the “facts” of what we want students 
to learn in law school, legal educators must also be cognizant of our own 
factual contexts. If many disparate scholars have suggested reforming legal 
92. As Kristen Holmquist observes: “[T]he result of drawing artificial boundaries between the 
cognitive and the practical is to limit what it means to think like a lawyer . . . .” Challenging 
Carnegie, 61 J. legal edUc. 353, 365 (2012).
93. how PeoPle learN, supra note 71, at 51. 
94. The term “prior knowledge” has a specific and important meaning in educational theory. 
Students connect what they learn to things they already know, and research suggests that 
can often be a helpful scaffold to learning, but also sometimes a hindrance if the activated 
prior knowledge is insufficient or inappropriate. For a useful overview of research on prior 
knowledge in learning theory, see sUsaN a. ambrose et al., how learNiNg works: 7 
research-based PriNciPles for smart teachiNg 10–39 (2010).
95. robert e. haskell, traNsfer of learNiNg: cogNitioN, iNstrUctioN, aNd reasoNiNg 
45–47 (2000).
96. daNiel t. williNgham, whY doN’t stUdeNts like school?: a cogNitive scieNtist 
aNswers qUestioNs aboUt how the miNd works aNd what it meaNs for the classroom 
133–37 (2010) (observing that experts are able to transfer knowledge and think more abstractly 
than novices because they organize well-understood material much more conceptually). 
97. See generally Mary Nicol Bowman & Lisa Brodoff, Cracking Student Silos: Linking Legal Writing and 
Clinical Learning Through Transference, 25 cliNical l. rev. 269, 280-81 (2019) (considering ways 
to facilitate transfer of skills between first-year legal writing classes and upper-level clinical 
courses).
98. That is to say, toward the highest levels in Bloom’s Taxonomy of Evaluating, or even Creating. 
This compares favorably with casebook learning of legal doctrine, which aims primarily at 
achieving the intermediate levels of Applying legal rules and Analyzing them in factual context, 
and despite the best intentions of its users may at times accomplish only the introductory 
cognition levels of Remembering or Understanding the rules introduced. beNJamiN bloom et al., 
taxoNomY of edUcatioNal obJectives: haNdbook 1, the cogNitive domaiN (1956).
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education, and a wide variety of thinkers are already invested in integrative 
learning in law schools, what realities on the ground are preventing it from 
becoming more pervasive?
One certainly is the always-present limitation of time. No one ever has 
enough of it, and law professors are hardly immune from time constraints. 
There are few readily available products that can immersively structure an 
entire semester-long or year-long inquiry into a subject in the way that more 
traditional casebooks do. So creating an immersion course currently requires 
a sizable investment of time that creating a casebook-driven course may not.99 
Furthermore, the differential time investment may not end after a one-time 
investment in course design. Instead, immersive classes require ongoing 
supervision of student work, including review of students’ planning, research, 
performance with clients and supervisors, and, of course, comments on their 
writing. 
But there are ways to control at least some of the faculty workload in these 
courses. Having students work in teams, for example, fractionalizes the number 
of individual papers to be reviewed. Assigning students to reflect on some of 
their work processes, performances, and products—in addition to being a key 
practice for self-regulated learning—has the benefit of giving the faculty member 
a concrete summary and a sense of the students’ own understanding of their 
work to concentrate their responses upon. Guidelines or rubrics can also be 
introduced to help faculty members streamline their feedback and maximize 
the information conveyed while reducing the time invested.100 Moreover, 
as more and more law schools are encouraging or even requiring formative 
assessments that add to faculty workloads,101 the distinction between the time 
commitments involved in immersive teaching and more traditional casebook 
teaching may be growing less distinct. Despite all of the many strategies that 
can make this kind of teaching manageable, though, there is no denying that it 
can be a lot of work. And there remains the unequivocal factual reality that for 
sheer logistical reasons, immersive class size must usually be smaller than it is 
in casebook lecture courses.102 This is hopefully offset by the educational value 
for students and the unalloyed enjoyment it can offer faculty.
Another concern for many law faculty members is expertise—or more 
accurately, a comfort with their own expertise (or their ability to develop it) 
with respect to the material of a subject they might teach, but discomfort with 
99. Perhaps over time the legal academy or some external commercial enterprise may address 
that imbalance?
100. See, e.g., Sophie M. Sparrow, Describing the Ball: Improve Teaching by Using Rubrics – Explicit Grading 
Criteria, 2004 mich. st. l. rev. 1 (2004).
101. Olympia Duhart, The ‘F’ Word: The Top Five Complaints (and Solutions) About Formative Assessment, 67 
J. legal edUc. 531, 536–38 (2018). 
102. For example, my Family Law in Practice course currently caps at twenty-eight registrants. 
That’s considerably fewer than a more traditional family law survey course may enroll, but 
it is still a reasonably economical way to deliver a high-quality educational experience to 
plenty of law students. 
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the limitless array of mastery that immersion learning entails. It’s reasonable 
to recognize that few of us feel equally capable of teaching legal doctrine, 
reviewing legal writing, supervising students’ interactions with clients and 
experts, commenting on their research strategies, and so on. And probably 
for good reason. There are decades of accreted wisdom to assimilate in every 
one of these fields. Yet law professors routinely take on the teaching of new 
subjects despite our not-yet-fully-developed proficiency in teaching them. We 
hope and expect that we will do reasonably well to begin with, and will get 
better over time. Too, are not most law professors already specialists in legal 
research, legal analysis, and legal writing? Many have also practiced law in 
the areas in which they teach, but for those who have not there is perhaps the 
option of co-teaching an immersive course with another law professor or an 
adjunct faculty practitioner who possesses the requisite experience.
We expect law students and beginning lawyers to develop a divergent 
collection of professional competencies.103 We tell students no one expects 
them to be perfect in all arenas at once, and that the vulnerability they feel in 
learning to do something they have not done before is not a weakness—it is a 
vital precursor to growth. Can we really expect any less of ourselves?
IV. Interpreting Rules
Student C: I think it’s great that Frankie and Saanvi want 
to have kids. It seems like they’ll be excellent parents.
Student B: I agree, but I feel thrown by the whole donor 
idea.
Student A: In what way?
Student B: Well, maybe I’m being too rigid here, but the 
idea of a kid having up to four parents is kind of freaking 
me out. Two moms and two dads? And don’t get me started 
on how this could work legally. It could be a total mess!
Student A: I don’t really feel that way, to be honest. But 
on the other hand, I also don’t know how we could set up 
legally binding agreements among all four of them. We know 
Frankie and Saanvi’s situation, but what do we really know 
about Victor and Anthony? Can they both be legal parents 
of this still-hypothetical child? Are they even legally married, 
103. For one example of the myriad skills needed for law practice, see the twenty-six Shultz-
Zedeck Lawyering Effectiveness Factors identified in the research undertaken on behalf 
of the Law School Admissions Council. Marjorie M. Shultz & Sheldon Zedeck, Predicting 
Lawyer Effectiveness: Broadening the Basis for Law School Admission Decisions, 36 law & soc. iNqUirY 
620 (2011).
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and would that matter with respect to parentage? Can there 
possibly be any precedent for this anywhere? 
Student B: Exactly!
Student A: And what if Frankie and Saanvi decide this 
is all too complicated for them. Could it be possible for 
Anthony or Victor to be a known donor yet not be a legal 
father?
Student C: But don’t forget they’ve said they weren’t 
necessarily set on the “they are all parents” arrangement. It’s 
just one possibility.
Student B: In terms of legal parenting protection, this 
whole thing is scaring me. I can’t imagine we can tell them 
anything with any kind of certainty, no matter how we feel 
about it personally. 
Student C: Look, somebody always had to take a risk on the 
outcome for every big change that has ever happened in the 
law. Isn’t it actually our client’s job to decide how much risk 
she can accept?
Student A: OK, but do Frankie and Saanvi even know 
what the risks are? Do we?
Student C: Folks, we’re getting way ahead of ourselves by 
worrying primarily about the most unusual scenario. The 
women don’t even know for certain that that’s what they 
want. Our main concern here is with Frankie and Saanvi 
and their legal relationship with this child. If they have a 
child with a donor, is it legally equally both of theirs? Do we 
have to do some work to make even that happen, no matter 
whether there are dads we need to worry about or not?
Student B: That’s helpful. I guess we’d better start looking 
at the legal ramifications of one, two, three, or four parents, 
since we’re going to have to talk Frankie through all of them. 
So where do we start?
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A. Students/Lawyers: Understanding Boundaries and Possibilities in the Interpretation of 
Legal Rules
This vignette puts our student-lawyers in the position of having to clarify 
the current legal rules pertaining to the parentage of a child born in a same-sex 
marriage, in which it is not biologically possible for one child to be the genetic 
offspring of both spouses. Since most traditional parentage law arose in the 
context of opposite-sex spouses conceiving children or adopting them together, 
this will require some interpretive extrapolation of that body of law to extend 
to the client’s potential circumstances. Reams of meditative commentary have 
been written about the kinds of reasoning that legal interpretation consists 
of104 and it is not the project of this article to review all of them or to add 
substantially to that body of thought. Instead, it may be valuable to look more 
narrowly at what our student-lawyers will have to do with rules of law for the 
work they now find themselves engaged in.
Of course, the process of “interpreting rules” usually originates first in 
fully comprehending the present legal regime through the process of finding/
knowing, stating accurately, and meticulously applying the laws that currently 
exist to determine whether they irrefutably cover the facts at hand. If they do, 
the lawyers can probably proceed straightforwardly with their work by using 
those resolutions.105 The interpretive work (and for lawyers, the fun?) comes 
in when there are no clear answers to the client’s problem in the existing body 
of legal rules because the law is in flux, the facts are novel, or, as we possibly 
have here, both.
To answer their client’s immediate questions about parental rights if she 
and Saanvi were to add children to their family, our student-lawyers might 
therefore begin by thinking through the legal situation for similarly situated 
different-sex couples. They could then generate some sort of recent timeline 
understanding of how those rules of law have and sometimes have not been 
applied to same-sex couples. That is because family law has for generations 
been finding ways to protect the parenting rights of married opposite-sex 
couples using assisted reproductive technologies.106 Either due to courts’ 
104. For one brief summary in a clinical context, see Robert D. Dinerstein & Elliot S. Milstein, The 
Indeterminacy of Law in cliNical PedagogY, supra note 70; see also Anya Bernstein, Democratizing 
Interpretation, 60 wm & marY l. rev. 435 (2018) (arguing that judges must embrace their 
opportunities and obligations to interpret through discretionary sources).
105. Although if that outcome turns out to disadvantage their clients the next step may be to see 
if they can find a way to interpret the law differently. If so, then this becomes the place for 
capable advocacy. If not, then it is what it is. As the Lawyering Method observes, in finding 
and interpreting rules, “there is an obligation both to be responsibly truthful and to serve 
clients faithfully . . . [which] requires negotiating tensions between the quest for a proper or 
just result and the quest to prevail.” Experiential Learning Lab, supra note 21.
106. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur. Ct. 1973) (recognizing the 
husband of a woman artificially inseminated with a donor’s sperm as the lawful father of the 
child). Also see both the original and currently revised versions of the Uniform Parentage 
Act (UPA) and the Uniform Status of Assisted Conception Act (USCACA) proffered by the 
National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, which include stratagems to 
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pure lack of imagination about the possible multiplicity of family forms,107 
differences in legalization of the marital status of the adults,108 or outright 
bias,109 families with parents of the same gender have not always automatically 
been afforded the same recognition of their status.
Once they begin their research, our student-lawyers will find they have 
to sort through some earlier cases in their states recognizing (or not) de facto 
parents,110 cases granting (or not) “second parent” adoptions111 to previously 
nonlegal same-sex parents, and will have to discover whether, post-Obergefell, 
their state now permits married partners of the same gender to be listed 
together as parents on a child’s birth certificate from the time of delivery112 
without the requirement of an adoption or any further judicial action. That 
ensure that both members of an infertile heterosexual couple will be seen as co-equal parents 
of a child they conceive through assisted reproduction.
107. Particularly the until-recently-ubiquitous presumption that a child could have at most one 
parent of each gender at the same time. See, e.g., N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 357 (Sup. Ct. 
Colo. 2000) (“[b]ecause a child can have only one legal father . . . .”). Cf. Nancy D. Polikoff, 
This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother 
and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 geo. l.J. 459 (1990) (early advocacy for legal recognition 
of more than one parent of the same gender).
108. Before Obergefell v. Hodges, or individual state determinations to solemnize same-sex marriage 
or provide comity to same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions. Same sex marriages still 
have an extraordinarily short history in the United States, beginning slowly after first being 
recognized in Massachusetts in 2004. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 789 N.E.2d 941 
(Mass. 2003).
109. There were, of course, long-standing presumptions that gay men and lesbians were perforce 
unfit parents. For but one example, see the saga of Sharon Bottoms, whose own mother 
successfully sued to remove her child from her care after Bottoms began a relationship with 
a woman. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995). It is occasionally hard to read some 
court decisions about legal parentage as grounded in anything but prejudice. See, e.g., In re 
Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (denying legal parenthood to a 
now-divorced transgender husband of an inseminated wife, despite the state having listed 
him as the father on the child’s birth certificate, despite uncontested statutory authority 
conferring parenthood on the male spouse of a woman using donor insemination to 
conceive, and despite a “savings clause” in the state parentage act intended to provide for 
legal fatherhood even in the event the marriage conferring that status was subsequently 
deemed invalid, as this one had been.).
110. The American Law Institute recognizes parentage by estoppel or in effect ali PriNciPles 
§ 203(1)(c); see more generally Lea Moalemi, Blood Will Not Justify My Relation: Same-Sex Couples and 
their Battle for Standing as De Facto Parents, 56 fam. ct. rev. 490 (2018); Susan E. Oram, De Facto 
Parental Rights: A View from the Trenches, 23 me. B.J. 150 (2008). 
111. See, e.g., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); see generally Jane S. Schacter, 
Constructing Families in a Democracy: Courts, Legislatures and Second-Parent Adoption, 75 chi.-keNt l. 
rev. 933 (2000).
112. A minority but growing number of states now routinely list married same-sex partners as 
parents on the birth certificate of a child born to the marriage, thus obviating the need for a 
second-parent adoption (although even in those states nonbiological parents are sometimes 
advised to nonetheless complete an adoption as additional protection against any dispute). 
Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 harv. l. rev. 1185, 1240–49 
(2016).
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is a dizzying set of evolutions in the law to get to the present rules, and 
understanding the history of these changes may be crucial for anyone who 
seeks to give advice about how the law would treat parentage for a family like 
Frankie and Saanvi’s.
All this just to understand the law governing the most straightforward 
possibility the vignette suggests Frankie and Saanvi might consider: having 
a child who is the biological progeny of one of the women in the partnership, 
gestated by her with the intention of producing issue of the marriage, with no 
plan for legal involvement by the sperm donor. 
Then the student-lawyers will have to consider ramifications of associated 
alternatives their client might select, including: What if the couple decides 
to expand their family by adoption rather than pregnancy? What if doctors 
implant the fertilized egg of one woman into the womb of another? What if 
the couple decides to use a known sperm donor rather than an anonymous 
one? What if he is the biological relative of the noninseminated partner and, 
therefore, the noninseminating mother has some genetic link to the child? 
What if the couple wants the donor to have an ongoing relationship with the 
child; does he then have to be a recognized parent? What if they would like 
him to be a legal father? And finally, what if, as seems to be making Student 
B so very apprehensive, they really do plan to have two legal fathers and two 
legal mothers for their not-yet-conceived child?
Many of these questions have pretty definitive answers, though ones that 
may vary significantly from state to state.113 Our student-lawyers must research 
to find out what those answers are. In doing so they will teach themselves 
quite a significant body of family law. And since there might always be the 
possibility the family could relocate, they should have at least a rough notion 
of how those responses might be different in other states. In other words, they 
have to fully learn the existing legal rules.
With respect to the final question, though, which our vignette indicates is 
not just a moot hypothetical but instead a real possibility their client is raising, 
the student-lawyers are probably going to find that the question is a new one 
and the law at present provides no conclusive precedent.114 The best they can 
hope to do is to interpret—to imaginatively yet critically extend—the existing 
rules of law in an effort to try to predict how it might be applied to the alluded 
four-parent scenario. 
113. See id. at 1140–65.
114. At the time of this writing they are going to find just a very few cases, none of which 
establishes unequivocal precedent. Probably the most closely related circumstances arise in 
a New York case determining that a third parent had standing to seek custody and visitation 
of the child he had been raising with his husband (the child’s biological and legal father) 
and their friend (the child’s biological and legal mother). Raymond T. v. Samantha G., 
74 N.Y.S.3d 730 (Fam. Ct. 2018). But their research should also show that so far that case 
remains an outlier and has not persuaded other jurisdictions.
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Interpretative work in law often starts from analogical thinking.115 If two 
circumstances are similar, then the same rule of law ought to govern both.116 
This, though, poses the question of what makes different situations sufficiently 
“similar.” 
Our student-lawyers might start by asking whether there are any cases 
already recognizing more than two legal parents. If they tried that avenue 
they would probably soon discover that advocacy on behalf of stepparents 
has resulted in a number of cases of their being granted status in loco parentis117 
even without termination of the parenting rights and obligations of one of 
the original legally sanctioned parents.118 These cases somewhat acknowledge 
the possibility of a family having three adults functioning as parents due to 
the exigencies of remarriage. Student-lawyers might also encounter opinions 
permitting a reduction from two-parent families to one where warranted by 
the facts, despite statutes designed to perpetuate continuation of at least two 
legal parents.119 Or they’ll locate other decisions restricting the expansion of 
parenting rights in new family formations to ones that can be seen as “the 
functional equivalent of the traditional husband-wife relationship.”120 Are 
these circumstances “similar” to Frankie and Saanvi’s potential four-parent 
family? Unclear, but it does highlight why in the vignette our student-lawyers 
are rightly interested in finding out whether the proposed dads are married. 
The stepparent rules may end up being analogized in some argument favoring 
legal status for all four parents.
Using what they learn about the history of recognizing parentage in assisted 
reproductive technology cases, or for stepparents, the team of student-lawyers 
might try to interpret those rules by reasoning deductively121 (working from 
115. Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by 
Analogy, 109 harv. l. rev. 923 (1996). 
116. Id. at 931–34.
117. Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepparents as Third Parties in Relation to their Stepchildren, 40 fam. l.q. 81, 
100–02 (2006).
118. A termination of the parenting rights of an original parent is ordinarily required for a 
stepparent adoption, usually upon consent of the terminating parent, but occasionally over 
his or her objection (e.g., In the matter of J.J.J., 718 P.2d 948 (Alaska 1986)).
119. See, e.g., In re: Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711 (Pa. Super Ct. 2019) (not reported) (against strict 
interpretation of adoption statute, the court permitted termination of a biological father’s 
paternity absent the usually required averment of intended adoption by new father, due to 
the horrific circumstances of the children’s having been conceived as the product of decades-
long rape of the mother and a possible ongoing threat of abuse to the children even with the 
incarceration of the biological father).
120. Adoption of Garrett, 841 N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (Sur. Ct. 2007) (denying paternal adoption of a 
child by the brother of the biological/legal mother).
121. The beginning point in articulating the process of deduction is often attributed to Aristotle 
(with perhaps is an updated nod to Sherlock Holmes) and is taught in nearly all philosophy 
courses specializing in logic. See JohN deweY, how we thiNk 79–90 (1991). Introductory 
legal writing/legal analysis textbooks commonly explain processes of deductive reasoning 
in some detail to show beginning law students how they will be expected to reason. For 
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the general to the particular) or inductively122 (working from the particular to 
the general). In addition, Frankie’s attorneys might also want to consider the 
policy basis for the rules in interpreting whether existing law might somehow 
reach to cover a family with two mothers and two fathers.123 An understanding 
of the reasons for what the law currently is helps predict what it might become 
under the new circumstances.
Our student-lawyers absolutely must engage in this interpretation of legal 
rules to answer their client’s question. Yet even they already understand that in 
such novel circumstances it is extraordinarily unlikely they will ever produce 
an unambiguous answer. It is almost undoubtedly true that no amount of 
reading, research, or thoughtful interpretation of the law will fully conclude 
the investigation. In the absence of square precedent from within their exact 
jurisdiction which specifically recognizes a four-parent family comprising two 
same-sex couples with two members who are the biological progenitors of the 
child, our student-lawyers will probably not be able to provide a conclusive 
answer to their client about the legal status of such a family. That precedent 
certainly does not exist at the moment. 
Even suppose it did. Depending on the client’s determination and the 
advocate’s creativity, it is still precisely in the nature of lawyers to look for 
ways to compare or distinguish such precedent to argue that it should or 
should not determine Frankie and Saanvi’s case. The only thing that could 
unquestionably settle the law for Frankie and Saanvi would be a final statement 
of the law in their specific case by a judge deciding it. That, in turn, would 
prompt subsequent refinement of the rules when some relatedly but differently 
constituted families argue that the (hypothetical future) Frankie/Saanvi case 
did or did not apply to them—thus illustrating the almost-endless cycle of 
interpreting rules of law, and exemplifying why the processes of interpreting 
law and fact are inextricably interwoven.
But our student-lawyers must assist their client now. They have to help 
decide in the absence of well-settled precedent whether they want to take the 
legal risks associated with building a four-parent family. Facts and rules may 
be ever-entangled in law, but as is so commonly true, here the rules will affect 
the facts we have to work with because they may end up determining how 
our client sets about trying to bring a child into her family in the first place. 
The lawyers’ interpretation of the rules will influence Frankie’s understanding 
just one such sample, see brett a. brosseit et al., aPPlied critical thiNkiNg & legal 
aNalYsis: PerformaNce oPtimizatioN for law stUdeNts aNd ProfessioNals 139–41 (2017) 
[hereinafter aPPlied critical thiNkiNg].
122. Again, frequently attributed to Aristotle. For an in-depth examination of basic principles of 
induction, see irviNg m. coPi et al., iNtrodUctioN to logic 495–599 (15th ed. 2019); see 
also aPPlied critical thiNkiNg, supra note 122, at 133–35 (summarizing induction for a law 
student audience).
123. Policy arguments are grounded in normative claims about what is a public good. See 
michael evaN gold, a Primer oN legal reasoNiNg 122–37 (2018); wilsoN hUhN, the 
five tYPes of legal argUmeNt 51–53 (2002).
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of how much legal risk would be involved in a currently untested family 
formation, which in turn could have direct consequences for how Frankie 
ultimately constructs her family.
B. Professors/Case Supervisors: Using Well-Chosen Factual Settings to Stimulate 
Interpretation of Legal Rules
Given the enterprise of this article, this section could proceed in several 
directions. We might ask: How do we navigate and interpret the rules of legal 
education? Or alternatively: What is the role of interpreting rules in legal 
education? 
The inquiries do not truly diverge, however. It could be fairly said that 
virtually all aims of legal education and its pedagogy are concerned with 
imparting both the substance of a common body of legal rules and the ability 
to use them professionally. Most of the unresolved disputes in law teaching 
stem from differing emphases on those proficiencies or on differing ideas 
about how to impart them, not from disagreement that both matter. So this 
project takes as given that institutions of legal education care about students 
learning bodies of substantive law and skills in interpreting and using them. 
Assuming that’s true, the “rules”124 structuring law school courses tend 
to require classes to straddle some middle ground between introducing the 
specific common-law principles and statutes that govern the topic we teach 
and probing more deeply into the meaning of the discipline or of the workings 
of law itself. No one law school course can ever teach all of the rules of law 
there are to know on a particular legal topic. Even if it could, the law would 
keep changing and evolving; its practitioners must be adept at interpreting 
the extant rules and applying them to new situations. Thus the common-
law professors’ debate about topical “coverage” in their courses125 misses the 
point. A pretty indisputable rule about law classes, then, is that we cannot ever 
possibly cover everything.126
124. Here, “norms” might be a more accurate descriptor, if we see that designation as 
encompassing both behaviors that are required and those that are only customary and 
expected. Both norms and rules can function similarly to control conduct, though of course 
the consequences for violating them might be very different. Indeed, some earlier versions 
of the Lawyer Method Elements did reference “norms” as a category and include legal rules 
as a subset within that umbrella. (Unpublished manuscripts on file with the author.) But 
the familiarity and clarity of referencing “rules” has its appeal as well—even if at times those 
“rules” are more metaphorical than mandatory.
125. For a few examples of legal educators’ skepticism regarding concerns about coverage 
justifying resistance to new teaching methodologies, see Steven I. Friedland, Trumpeting 
Change: Replacing Tradition with Engaged Legal Education, 3 eloN l. rev. 93, 125–26 (2011); Robert 
F. Blomquist, Some Thoughts on Law School Curriculum Reform: Scaling the Mountainside, 29 val. U. 
l. rev. 641, 656–57 (1995).
126. Another corresponding rule is that we are probably never really finished teaching anything. 
It is unrealistic to assume that one class or one year is enough time to fully master the 
intricate nuances of lawyers’ thinking, for example, so teachers of upper-level law classes 
are probably remiss if they do not include teaching legal analysis as one objective of their 
course. 
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One thing every course can reasonably aim to do, though, is to ensure 
students are given the opportunity to deeply encounter the core concepts of 
its subject. Educational theorists Aaron Pallas and Anna Neumann define 
core concepts as those “basic building blocks” that depict “a field’s unique 
substantive concerns and distinctive knowledge structures and dynamics.”127 
In other words, they form a base from which further meaningful inquiry into 
the subject could, and would have to, spring. Think “supply and demand” in 
economics, for example. 128 Understanding that notion—really understanding 
it—is foundational to learning pretty much anything else in the field. 
It is important to distinguish “core concepts” from the “topics” typically 
covered in a particular subject. First of all, there are probably fewer of them. 
Maybe at most three or four. Maybe only one. The core concepts will be those 
ideas or processes which by their very nature provide a gateway to learning 
all of the topics that the subject matter can muster. For lawyers, the core 
concepts of our subject matter almost always boil down to the law’s ways 
of addressing weighty social matters like “punishment” in criminal law, or 
perhaps “responsibility” in torts. If our students struggle to understand that 
this is what the body of law they are learning is about, they may study an array 
of legal rules but will be ill-equipped to truly and deeply know those rules, 
or to actually use them. Law teachers would be well advised to think clearly 
about what core concepts they want to get across in their subjects, and to 
concentrate on and return to those core concepts until their students move 
toward mastery. Then we must enable students to bring those concepts to the 
many topics the subjects typically include. 
So what are the core concepts in family law? 
Like almost anything in law, that could probably be debated endlessly. But 
I believe it would not be too controversial to suggest that one core concept 
is what makes someone the parent of a child with all of the ensuing legal 
privileges and responsibilities that status grants. Many potentially conflicting 
factors might dispose of that question: genetics,129 intention,130 or perhaps habit, 
127. coNvergeNt teachiNg, supra note 45, at 67.
128. Id. at 68.
129. It is sometimes important legally to distinguish genetics from biology, because they may not 
always correspond. In cases of gestational surrogacy, the woman who biologically gives birth 
to a child may not have any genetic connection to the infant and may not be the child’s legal 
parent. See Mark Strasser, The Updating of Baby M: A Confused Jurisprudence Becomes More Confusing, 
78 U. Pitt. l. rev. 181,183, 194–201 (2016). Conversely, in donor egg insemination, a woman 
who gives birth to a child may have no genetic relationship yet be both the intended and 
legal parent of a child she gave birth to. See NatioNal coNfereNce oN commissioNers of 
UNiform state laws, UNiform PareNtage act §§ 802–804, 809, 815 (2017) [hereinafter 
UPA].
130. UPA § 703 (relying on “intent to be a parent” for legal parentage in assisted reproduction 
cases). The state of California even provides statutory forms giving lawful effect to stated 
intentions of parenting in assisted reproduction cases. Cal. Fam. Code § 7613.5. The 
student-lawyers should also note, though, that the UPA remains model legislation that has 
not been widely adopted, and that California law is considered to be a leader in the area of 
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or function.131 These factors may historically have been hard to disaggregate, 
because they usually converge when a fertile heterosexual couple conceives by 
ordinary means. But parentage gets more complicated and more interesting 
when those factors are not in exact alignment. Thus, the bulk of parentage 
law in most family law courses arises in contexts in which the factors conflict, 
forcing courts or legislators to establish hierarchies among the considerations. 
Decisions about which factors matter most may change over time, and they 
can be diametrically opposite in different jurisdictions.132 Learning this teaches 
burgeoning family lawyers that all of the considerations matter to some extent, 
and there is no easy consensus about how to resolve difficult questions about 
such a profoundly important question as “Who is a parent?”
Does it go without saying that our vignette shows the student-lawyers 
preparing to grapple with precisely that question? And that they seem already 
to have a sense of the immense importance of the answer for their client and 
her potential future child? 
In a similar vein, the earlier vignette in Part I included student-lawyers 
contending with what most family law scholars would identify as another 
core concept in the subject matter: What is the legal, cultural, and personal 
significance of marriage? Here is where the framing of the facts and characters 
as written by Davis and Davenport shows a particular genius. By presenting 
student-lawyers with a client who is trying to decide whether to get married 
at all, the students have to consider carefully the distinction between personal 
relationship decisions and the benefits and obligations conferred by the 
state within the legal institution of marriage. They have to ask themselves 
why marriage is a function of government at all, rather than purely a private 
commitment. Perhaps they will begin to interrogate the line demarking 
personal autonomous choice in family formation and what is, or should be, 
part of the public purview.133
This is a significant departure from the approach Susan Apel took in her 
visionary family law simulation course. There, an already-married client’s 
presenting issue was a divorce.134 By tracing the typical stages of the divorce, 
intentional parenting, and even that state does not permit intention to supersede genetics in 
all instances. See Jason P. v. Danielle S., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (holding 
that a sperm donor was not precluded from asserting presumed biological parentage).
131. That is, by acting as a de facto parent. See UPA § 609. For a mapping of de facto parentage 
laws in different U.S. jurisdictions see De Facto Parent Recognition, movemeNt advaNcemeNt 
ProJect (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.lgbtmap.org/img/maps/citations-parents-de-facto.
pdf. 
132. E.g., with respect to functional parenting laws, compare Chatterjee v. King, 280 P. 3d 283 
(N.M. 2012) with McGuffin v. Overton, 542 N.W.2d 288 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), app. den., 546 
N.W.2d 256 (Mich. 1996).
133. Which might further spur the more philosophically minded among them to wonder whether 
that question more fundamentally lies under virtually all of the great unresolvable questions 
in law. 
134. No More Casebooks, supra note 10, at 701.
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Apel’s students move through the topics commonly taught in family law 
casebook classes: rules governing child support, division of marital property, 
spousal support obligations, and so forth.135 Apel beautifully demonstrates 
that with thoughtful manipulation of character and fact, doctrinal “coverage” 
is just as easy (or difficult) to achieve in an immersion course as it is in a more 
traditional one.136 In fact, I did just that for my own immersion course. As I 
was creating my version I scanned the contents of just about all of the family 
law casebooks on the market, selected the topics that seemed common among 
them and also struck me as particularly important, and then modified Davis 
and Davenport’s narratives so the progress of the clients’ cases would naturally 
raise each one. It wasn’t especially hard to do.
But the innovation that Davis and Davenport’s scenario brings is a more 
critical and fundamental investigation into the legal institution of marriage. 
To answer some of Frankie’s questions in the first vignette, the student-lawyers 
had to think deeply about the very meaning of marriage in law and society. 
This consequently allows the class to bring in some of the larger constitutional 
questions about family autonomy and the role of the state. 137 Addressing these 
core questions experientially, with the explicit goal of helping their own client 
think them through, enriches the students’ understanding of marriage itself. 
That should in turn strengthen their mastery and retention of the many legal 
rules pertaining to marriage law that they will learn along the way. 
Likewise, by asking themselves whether existing parenting laws can be 
interpreted to permit a two-mother-two-father family, our student-lawyers will 
simultaneously develop a deeper understanding of what the law does currently 
establish.138
I would posit that the Davis/Davenport scenario is simply one excellent 
example of the kind of fictional universe that by its very design requires deep 
engagement with core concepts in its subject matter; further, that scenarios 
engaging identified core concepts could be created for virtually any subject 
in law; and finally, that having that engagement be an essential outgrowth 
of their client work enables students to survey the legal rules of the subject 
while at the same time reinforcing their learning about lawyers’ interpretive 
processes, which can always be further developed. 
135. Id. at 703.
136. Though not without allowing for some convenient artificialities. For example, in my Family 
Law and Practice class students draft a prenuptial contract which sadly never gets signed, 
so that when Frankie and Saanvi later get divorced my students will have to employ state 
regulations to resolve how their property will be divided. 
137. For example, in addition to the obviously directly relevant Obergefell decision, students read 
and consider Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
138. With a concomitant investigation of the big-picture constitutional background in cases like 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Michael H. v. Gerald D., 504 U.S. 905 (1992).
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V. Managing Interactions
Student A: Gosh, it’s so sad to work on a divorce. I suppose 
I am not the only one relieved when it seems, like it does for 
Saanvi,139 the couple hopes to treat each other respectfully. 
Those angry scorched-earth breakups are terrible for the 
couple, and I imagine they take a lot out of the attorneys, 
too.
Student B: I guess so. But my impression is some lawyers 
like that. Maybe even encourage it.
Student C: Well, we’re certainly not going to do that. Yet I 
don’t think that’s a guarantee that everything in this divorce 
is, and will, remain amicable. I mean . . . .
Student B: [interrupting] . . . That’s right. No matter 
how pragmatically people want to approach it, breakups 
involve hurt feelings and can turn messier than anyone ever 
expected.
Student A: Plus, when there are kids involved, like Saanvi’s 
daughter here, the two can have a lot more conflict than they 
would if they were just dividing up property. 
Student C: Yeah, and the stakes for trying to behave 
cooperatively are even higher. Zelda is still a toddler, which 
means Saanvi will be actively co-parenting with her ex for 
at least another decade and a half. Probably more.
Student A: So do you think Saanvi’s hope for primary 
custody is realistic? It seems like Frankie has actually spent 
more time with Zelda so far, and I’m guessing Frankie’s 
lawyers will fight that. I’m worried, too, that us pushing 
for that will make it harder to get a favorable economic 
settlement for our client. There are only so many things at 
issue to negotiate.
139. In defiance of professional responsibility rules (and basic ethics), students who have thus 
far represented Frankie now switch to working with Saanvi in the marital dissolution section 
of the course. This serves the purpose of introducing a different client’s perspective without 
having to take time for the class to learn a new family’s facts. Though we generally strive 
where possible for verisimilitude, there are certainly times when we use the advantages of 
artificiality to facilitate immersion learning.
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Student B: Hold on a minute! I know you probably didn’t 
mean to suggest it, but to me there’s something super-
uncomfortable about the idea that we might trade time with 
the kid for money in a divorce.
Student A: Of course that’s not what I meant! Although 
. . . [spoken more tentatively] um, isn’t that sort of what 
sometimes happens in a divorce settlement? We have to do 
a good job representing Saanvi’s interests in every area we 
negotiate. And sometimes matters in a negotiation end up 
connected. 
Student C: OK. We have got our work cut out for us 
prepping for our settlement conference with Frankie’s 
lawyers.
A. Students/Lawyers: Treating Interactive Work as a Challenging 
and Vital Part of their Profession
This vignette leaps ahead in time. Frankie and Saanvi have legally wed (alas 
without ever having signed a prenuptial agreement even though my students 
drafted one!) and have been raising their140 child together. Our student-lawyers 
now represent Saanvi, and the couple is currently contemplating divorce. Our 
student-lawyers are doing well to carefully contrast what their client has thus 
far presented with what can typically happen in the difficult circumstances of 
dissolving a long-term relationship, especially one where child custody may 
be contested.
They know what she asked them to do—behave reasonably and fairly toward 
Frankie while settling the asset division and seeking exclusive or primary 
custody of Zelda—and they suspect she may be unrealistic in failing to realize 
those objectives may conflict. The lawyers appear appropriately concerned, 
and they are committed to exploring the tensions these interests may pose. 
As her advocates, they probably should be. 
Divorce cases are some of the most emotionally laden and important 
settings most family lawyers work in.141 The complexity of the work in my 
140. The child is legally theirs alone. In the facts the student-lawyers are given, one member of 
the male couple who considered parenthood with our protagonists did end up donating 
sperm, but neither he nor his partner considers himself the child’s father. While the men 
spend some time with Zelda, neither has ended up having a genuine parenting role in her 
life.  
141. Examining the body of family law more generally, but providing a perfect encapsulation of 
the stereotyped divorce action, Clare Huntington observes that “in its dispute-resolution 
mode, law intervenes in a heavy-handed and adversarial fashion, often exacerbating family 
conflicts by pitting one family member against another in a zero-sum, win-lose battle.” Clare 
Huntington, Failure to Flourish: How Law Undermines Family Relationships xii (2014).
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class is amplified by the fact that the divorce takes place in New York. The 
state retains fault-based causes of action in divorce proceedings, and was 
the last in the United States to freely sanction divorces without allegation of 
wrongdoing.142 If the divorce were litigated, allegations and proof of fault by 
one party could potentially affect not just the grounds for terminating the legal 
marriage143 but the terms of post-nuptial economic arrangements.144 Perhaps it 
could even impact custody or visitation.145
To be effective advocates for Saanvi, our student-lawyers are going to have 
to ask some very sensitive questions. They will naturally have to probe into 
some personal areas of her relationship that Saanvi may—but far more likely 
may not—feel comfortable talking about.146 They may have to help her sort 
through which feelings are important but not necessarily legally significant 
(“I just can’t believe she said that to me!”) and which might be material to 
her case. Meanwhile, anyone facing the prospect of divorce is likely to be 
distressed, anxious about the future, and perhaps defensive and eager to 
protect the memory of positive parts of the relationship, or conversely, to reject 
the possibility of anything positive about the past or the future. 
While preparing for what will ideally be a settlement in their case, the student-
lawyers will constantly have to manage their interpersonal communications 
with Saanvi. 147 They will have to establish her overall objectives, help her sort 
her priorities, and counsel her to compare those desires against what would 
be realistically achievable in litigation. Next they will have to get ready to 
advocate for her with opposing counsel, and eventually in court if the parties 
are unable agree on a private dissolution. In other words, every phase of their 
work will require effective interpersonal interactions, either with their client, 
another advocate, or possibly eventually a judge hearing the case. 
142. NY Dom. Rel. L. § 170.7, permitting divorce on the grounds that a marriage has broken 
down irretrievably for a period of at least six months, was adopted in 2010.
143. In New York, these consist of abandonment, cruel and inhuman treatment, extended 
imprisonment, adultery, or judgment following a legally ordered or privately agreed-upon 
separation. See NY Dom. Rel. L. §§ 170.1-170.6.
144. For one court’s extended and thoughtful examination of ways marital fault may relate to 
post-nuptial property allocation and spousal support, see Mani v. Mani, 183 N.J. 70 (2005).
145. Courts do strive to treat interpersonal difficulties between spouses as quite distinct from the 
parties’ roles as parents. But it is also easy to see how facts establishing at least some legal 
grounds for divorce (for example, cruelty or abandonment) could also bleed into the court’s 
assessment of a child’s best interests.
146. For example, does anyone feel truly at ease when asking an adult in a professional context 
for details about her sexual compatibility with her partner? Lawyers can (must?) learn 
techniques for asking uncomfortable questions of their clients. But that probably does not 
make it easy even for highly experienced practitioners, let alone the budding attorneys who 
are actually managing Saanvi’s case.
147. See Mary Pat Treuthart, A Perspective on Teaching and Learning Family Law, 75 UMKC L. rev. 
1047, 1048–49 (2007) (describing her own work as a family law practitioner and observing 
that “even when the legal aspects were . . . routine” her interactions with clients made it 
invigorating).
Method Lawyering 373
Clinical professors in law have probably always paid attention to the 
interpersonal dimensions of lawyering.148 A wider range of legal scholars began 
to catch up to the importance of the human aspects of law with the emergence 
in the 1990s of a field explicitly studying law and emotion.149 But this is not 
to suggest that managing interpersonal interactions is limited to handling 
people’s feelings. Instead it goes to the core of what it means to represent 
clients.150 The Lawyering Method explains that as a central component of their 
work, attorneys “communicate with clients, counterparties, witnesses, and 
various kinds of decisionmakers.”151 This inevitably requires “managing each 
interaction strategically to further institutional or client goals without being 
wrongfully deceptive or inappropriately manipulative.”152
Because our student-lawyers will ultimately need to advocate on their 
client’s behalf, they know that had better take care to listen to her carefully now. 
They stand in between their client and the person who will decide something 
incredibly important in her life, so their job is not just to understand and care 
about her goal of getting her son home, but to anticipate how they can put 
her in the most favorable position with the deciding body. Thus the attorneys 
must find ways now to counsel their client (which often takes the form of 
questioning their client or even disagreeing with her153) all while earning and 
retaining her trust. And they must do so while keeping in mind what they 
believe will eventually be the most effective way of persuasively interacting 
with agency officials or a judge. 
Notice how inextricably the interpersonal is entwined with the facts and 
the law.154 The student-lawyers in our vignette understand that what they learn 
148. Brook K. Baker, Learning to Fish, Fishing to Learn: Guided Participation in the Interpersonal Ecology of 
Practice, 6 Clinical L. Rev. 1, 9–10 (1999). 
149. See the PassioNs of law (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999). For additional current resources 
on law and emotion, see Robin West, Law’s Emotions, 19 rich. J.l. & PUb. iNt. 339 (2016); 
Carlton J. Patrick, A New Synthesis for Law and Emotions: Insights from the Behavioral Sciences, 47 ariz. 
st. l.J. 1239 (2015).
150. Grant H. Morris believes that confronting the emotional issues lawyers deal with in the 
practice of law is “an essential part of practical skills and professional identity development” 
for law students. Grant H. Morris, Teaching with Emotion: Enriching the Educational Experience of 
First-Year Law Students, 47 saN diego l. rev. 465, 474 (2010).
151. Experiential Learning Lab, supra note 21. 
152. Id.
153. “I believe lawyers should give advice, sometimes forcefully . . . .” Abbe Smith, “I Ain’t Takin’ No 
Plea”: The Challenges in Counseling Young People Facing Serious Time, 60 rUtgers l. rev. 11, 16 (2007). 
Some scholars might find that directedness antithetical to the “client-centered” lawyering 
introduced in 1977 by David Binder & Susan Price in their influential text Legal Interviewing 
and Counseling: A Client-Centered Approach. But so long as clients remain the determiners of their 
own circumstances, at least some commentators suggest that dialogue between lawyers 
and clients, even if challenging, is not inconsistent with client-centeredness or with good 
lawyering practice. See Robert Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 
32 ariz. l. rev. 501, 581–93 (1990).
154. Some would argue that the interpersonal is uniquely important in family law. For an example 
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about the facts of Saanvi’s case will determine what they can interpret and 
argue to be her legal rights. Which will correspondingly affect what they advise 
her to agree to and to challenge. Which then establishes how she authorizes 
her attorneys to advocate on her behalf. Which sets the parameters for their 
arguments and negotiation in her case. And all of this must take into account 
the lens through which a judge or other authority may perceive her case. All of 
it depends meaningfully on interactive dynamics. 
Managing interactions is sophisticated and challenging work. Our law 
student-lawyers are only beginning to be introduced to it,155 and they will 
probably have to devote many years of their careers to developing real 
interactive expertise. But immersion learning immediately and automatically 
places these crucial professional skills on the table. It shows beginners who 
spend so much of their time in law school absorbing rules and reasoning that 
legal doctrine will become only one component of what Eli Wald and Russell 
Pearce accurately describe as the immensely relational work of representing 
clients.156
B. Professors/Case Supervisors: Managing Faculty Interactions 
to Foster Integrated Teaching and Learning
From the professors’ perspective, managing interactions in an immersion 
class is one of the true delights of teaching it. It is also one of the most complex 
and demanding requirements of this kind of pedagogy.157
Of course, professors interact with students in every class and on every 
day. We generally believe it is up to us to guide that discourse successfully 
of the contention that factual and personal context are particularly heavily implicated in 
family law, see Eli Wald, The Contextual Problem of Law Schools, 32 Notre dame J.l. ethics 
& PUb. Pol’Y 281, 316–17 (2018). But see Kathryn Abrams, Barriers and Boundaries: Exploring 
Emotion in the Law of the Family, 16 va. J. soc. Pol’Y & l. 301, 307 (2008) (asserting that at 
least at the time of writing the law and emotions scholarship focused on the family was 
underdeveloped).
155. Though it may well be true that law schools ought to pay far greater attention to teaching 
this, and much earlier on. Joshua D. Rosenberg, Teaching Empathy in Law School, 36 U. saN. 
fraN. l. rev. 621, 631 (2002).
156. Eli Wald & Russell G. Pearce, Being Good Lawyers: A Relational Approach to Law Practice, 29 geo. J. 
legal ethics 601 (2016). The phrase “relational lawyering” was perhaps introduced in the 
early 1990s or before. See Serena Stier, Reframing Legal Skills: Relational Lawyering, 42 J. legal. 
edUc. 303, 303 (1992) (introducing the concept in a review of two recently published works 
on client counseling). It has gained significant traction and is now in fairly common use. See, 
e.g., Susan L. Brooks, Mindful Engagement and Relational Lawyering, 48 sw. l. rev. 267 (2019).
157. Clinical law professors have developed almost a science of supervision to guide their 
practices when overseeing student lawyering work. See cliNical PedagogY, supra note 70, 
at 169–252. All law teachers who expect to simulate law practice experiences can learn a 
tremendous amount from this scholarship. But because we deal with matters that, in the 
end, do not really resolve events in actual people’s lives, immersion teachers may also be able 
to get away with being slightly less ambitiously deliberate in their supervisory rules. That 
may be a fair tradeoff for such a multidimensional teaching and learning modality.
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in our own classrooms,158 so we may already treat the “managing” part of the 
interaction as a component of our teaching. Yet that work is geometrically more 
complicated when students are immersed in real-feeling client representation.
It may be useful to disaggregate “managing” from “interactions.” First let’s 
observe just how many distinct interactions there are. Our vignette suggests 
the student-lawyers have already met with their new client, so that’s one. They 
will probably end up negotiating with opposing counsel or perhaps mediating 
a settlement. That’s at least another, maybe more. They may end up arguing 
their client’s case in front of a judge. If so, given the facts as we know them, 
we can expect they will need to prepare their client for the proceeding. Also, 
the student-lawyers are managing their own collaboration. In all our vignettes 
they seem to be doing a pretty good job of advantageously using their different 
reactions to the clients, rather than allowing variances to hamper their 
teamwork.159 Are we up to five or six interactions just for this one snippet of 
one case in the course? There’s plenty to keep adding: Throughout a semester 
in my Family Law in Practice class students will interact with a taxation 
consultant, an expert on child protective proceedings, multiple supervisors, at 
least three different clients, a child welfare worker, a mediator, and one another 
as opposing counsel.160
In short, the work in the immersion course requires a rather a lot of 
interacting. Far more than takes place in a typical casebook-driven course. 
This then raises the question: Is it the immersion instructor’s job to manage all 
of these relations? 
Depends on what we mean by “manage.” It is revealing that the Merriam-
Webster definition for the verb indicates that it can be used either transitively 
or intransitively.161 The intransitive version of “to manage” means “to direct or 
carry on business.”162 Intransitive verbs do not allow for direct objects, so in this 
meaning of the word the action itself is all. The person managing is the person 
doing. But the dictionary lists the transitive form of the verb first: “to handle 
158. See generally michael hUNter schwartz et al., what the best law teachers do 177–85, 
241–58 (2013) (detailing the control yet flexibility with which master law teachers expect to 
run their classrooms).
159. Let’s be honest about the fact that productive cooperation will probably not always happen, 
in which case addressing any tensions within teams is yet another set of interactions the 
students, the professor, or both, will have to manage.
160. For my own classes I find it enjoyable to play any of these roles myself, but I usually don’t 
have to. Colleagues from both within my institution and outside of it have been eager to 
volunteer to come to class and play one of these roles. The variety of differing styles in 
interaction is immensely valuable to my students, and having guests play the roles affords 
me the opportunity to act as an intermediary, or sort of emcee for some of my own classes. 
[The very fact that so many busy professionals are keen to play these roles may also say 
something about a hunger for new forms of teaching in the legal academy.]
161. merriam-webster’s dictioNarY (online ed.), https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/manage.
162. Id.
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or direct with a degree of skills.”163 Thus in this more primary sense of the 
term, the person managing is the person facilitating, coordinating, or maybe 
overseeing the processes others are involved in. The definitional distinction 
here provides a neat metaphor for the kinds of “managing interactions” that 
the best immersion teachers probably do. We create opportunities for student-
lawyers to learn in role.
It is precisely that learning in role which so gloriously interleaves 
interactive, analytical, and problem-solving skills for law students and novice 
practitioners. The interpersonal dimension cannot be devalued when it is an 
indispensable part of doing the work at hand.164 Substantial research supports 
a conclusion that working in role enhances student learning and retention.165 
So the very process of managing the myriad interactions our student-lawyers 
have to participate in and anticipate can help them master the material they 
are learning. At the same time it necessarily improves their experience and 
proficiency at interviewing and counseling their client, or persuading someone 
on her behalf.
On the faculty side, meanwhile, we probably have a metaset of interactions 
we will need to attend to. How do professors committed to immersive teaching 
interact with those in the academy who may not value it?166 Or with law school 
administrators who may have concerns about resource allocation, particularly 
at the outset in the development phase of a new model of instruction? 
To the first point, it is probably true that very few colleagues will directly 
confront an eager immersion instructor to dispute the value of such a course. 
Quite the opposite; many law professors purport to favor such a turn toward 
more integrated learning in law schools. Yet—we do not ever seem to really 
change to get there.167 
163. Id.
164. Joshua D. Rosenberg, Interpersonal Dynamics: Helping Lawyers Learn the Skills, and the Importance, of 
Human Relationships in the Practice of Law, 58 U. miami l. rev. 1225 (2004).
165. See Daniel Druckman & Noam Ebner, Onstage or Behind the Scenes? Relative Learning Benefits of 
Simulation Role-Play and Design, 39 simUlatioN & gamiNg 465 (2007) (summarizing the 
literature showing benefits of role-based learning); see also Nellie Munin & Yael Efron, Role-
Playing Brings Theory to Life in a Multicultural Learning Environment, 66 J. legal edUc. 309 (2017); 
Nadja Alexander & Michelle LeBaron, Death of Role-Play, 31 hamliNe J. PUb. l. & Pol’Y 
459 (2010) (which despite its title looks favorably upon in-role learning). For background 
thinking about the place of drama and in-role work in learning, see aUgUsto boal, games 
for actors aNd NoN-actors (2d ed. 2002). 
166. To the extent that, at least in the 1990s, Leonard D. Pertnoy felt the need to remind the legal 
academy that it was fine to teach legal skills to law students. Skills is Not a Dirty Word, 59 mo. l. 
rev. 169 (1994); cf. Jonathan K. Van Patten, Skills for Law Students, 61 S.D. l. rev. 165, 195–200 
(2016) (concluding that legal education does provide skills valuable in the practice of law).
167. See Brent E. Newton, Preaching What They Don’t Practice: Why Law Faculties’ Preoccupation with 
Impractical Scholarship and Devaluation of Practical Competencies Obstruct Reform in the Legal Academy, 
62 S.C. l. rev. 105 (2010). I do not agree with the author’s conclusions that law faculty are 
obsessed with scholarship, or that scholarship is necessarily in contention with practical 
education. But I entirely endorse the notion that the legal academy tends to talk about 
changes in the ways we educate lawyers far more than we change.
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Managing our professional interactions to generate enthusiasm for 
meaningful (but manageable) reform is an important part of moving broadly 
toward a more contextualized and immersive pedagogy.168 Those who want 
to see such changes have to make difficult choices about whether we want to 
just do it ourselves in our own classes, or whether we seek more ambitiously 
to bring others along with us. In the case of the former, we need only to find 
ways to steer through an institutional curriculum approval process. For the 
latter, though, we need broad coalition-building and probably a willingness to 
collaborate and compromise. 
We need to think about who is most willing and able to change their model 
of law teaching: younger faculty who may have less investment in traditional 
modes of instruction (or in the lecture notes they may have honed over the 
course of a career), but who may also be focused on tenure or more generally 
on garnering recognition within their fields? Midcareer or more senior faculty 
members who are ready for something new, but whose time can be limited by 
the fact that they often bear the bulk of faculty governance and institutional 
service in addition to being more sought after for their scholarly expertise? 
Should it be clinical faculty members, doctrinal teachers, or professors of 
legal research and writing? Immersive teaching interrelates aspects of all of 
these fields and can thus be done by any. But there are likely to be relational 
implications depending upon who leads the charge.169
Prospective immersion teachers will also have to be strategic in managing 
their interactions with the people who hold the purse strings. Immersion courses 
do require resources that casebook courses simply do not routinely need. But 
one thing we lawyers know is that managing interactions persuasively often 
means aligning the relief sought with the interests of those with the power 
to decide in our favor. Perhaps it can be helpful, then, to remind deans and 
faculty who are on the fence about committing time and money to immersion 
projects about all those judges, alumni, and other critics of legal education 
who keep saying that law schools can, indeed must, do a much better job of 
preparing our students of the future to become lawyers.170 
168. As an instructive example, Professor Newton’s thoughtful critique offers insights that legal 
education reformers might find genuinely valuable, but . . . I am hard-pressed to believe 
most law professors would embrace being guided by a work that refers to their scholarly 
endeavors as providing “little if any social utility” and represent “a colossal amount of 
wasted resources.” Id. at 114.
169. One could argue that at least some programs traditionally thought to fall within the LRW 
rubric, but in fact emphasizing a far broader range of lawyering skills and competencies, are 
already paving the way. Yet even law schools that enthusiastically incorporate this immersive 
professional practice teaching in their curriculum have mostly limited the methodology to 
the programs themselves, rather than seeing them as a model for more widespread curricular 
innovation.
170. Eli Wald, The Contextual Problem of Law Schools, 32 Notre dame J.l. ethics & PUb. Pol’Y 281 
(2018) (considering the problem of teaching law “universally,” and arguing for a wholesale 
commitment to context in the law school curriculum). It may be encouraging that Sheldon 
Krantz and Michael Millemann found examples of some law schools moving in that 
direction. Legal Education in Transition: Trends and Their Implications, 94 Neb. l. rev. 1 (2015).
378 Journal of Legal Education
VI. Immersion Methodology and Legal Ed Reform
A. Teaching by Experiential Immersion Draws Significantly from the Work of Clinical Legal 
Education.
Is teaching by immersion simply another way of talking about clinical 
teaching? Because it can be adopted with a primary purpose of teaching legal 
doctrine, I don’t think so. But because it is driven by a client-based problem-
solving approach, and so deeply enmeshes learning rules and skills in a 
relational setting, it certainly shares a great deal with clinical methodology. 
Legal scholars can and have quibbled about how exactly to describe clinical 
methods.171 Yet, I do not think it is much of a leap to suggest that decades 
of work exploring clinical methods172 and simulation in law teaching have 
arrived at some basic agreements about what they consist of. I concur with 
Carolyn Grose’s sense that there exists at least a “loose consensus” regarding 
what constitutes clinical/experiential pedagogy.173 And although clinical 
methodology may not be fully congruent with immersion teaching, it is 
entirely consistent with it.174
Katherine Kruse’s characterization of the consensus themes in clinical 
teaching are consistent with teaching by immersion:
 1. Grounding learning in student-lawyers’ work on client problems
 2. Teaching lawyering work as a process
 3.  Providing (insisting on?) multiple opportunities to learn from critical 
reflection on their experiences.175
171. Discussing the elements of the “clinical method,” Frank S. Bloch noted as long ago as 1982 
that “no single model . . . was universally accepted.” The Andragogical Basis of Clinical Legal 
Education, 35 vaNd. l. rev. 321, 326 (1982). 
172. Perhaps beginning with Gary Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on 
Clinical Education as Methodology, cliNical edUc. for the law stUdeNt 374 (1973). For a 
contemporary summary of clinical theory and methodology, see the premier anthology in 
the field, cliNical PedagogY, supra note 70.
173. Carolyn Grose, Beyond Skills Training, Revisited: The Clinical Education Spiral, 19 cliNical l. rev. 
489, 497 (2019).
174. Maybe the only real departure from clinical instruction in our vision of immersion is an effort 
to emphasize and explicitly reinforce doctrinal learning as a key objective of the enterprise 
along with more traditional clinical goals of imparting practical skills and professional 
values. “Emphasis” is used here quite intentionally, because I do not actually view this as 
differing from what traditional clinical teaching actually does—merely from what it tends 
most often to be seen as doing. I firmly believe clinical learning has always incorporated 
and reinforced legal doctrine, Carnegie authors’ divisions notwithstanding. But though 
clinical teachers likely agree—see, e.g., id. at 501–503—most discussions of clinical pedagogy 
nonetheless accept the legal academy’s framing of doctrinal learning as primarily occurring 
in casebook-based course work. 
175. Id. at 498.
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Perhaps an even more apt description is based on Jeff Giddings’ doctoral 
research into clinical legal education programs, which defines the fundamentals 
of experiential learning method as:
  an intensive small group or solo learning experience in which each student 
takes responsibility for legal and related work for the client . . . in collaboration 
with a supervisor. Structures enable each student to receive feedback on their 
contributions and to take the opportunity to learn from their experiences 
through reflecting on matters including their interactions with the client, their 
colleagues, and their supervisor, as well as the ethical dimensions of the issues 
raised and the impact of the law and legal process.176
Both these accounts nicely encapsulate the approaches deployed in all of 
the different versions of immersion courses using the scenarios in this article. 
Each posits that we begin from actual experience working with a specific 
problem, then thoughtfully go about working on the problem, and that we 
learn from careful examination of that work. 
Yet, our purposes are from those in most clinical courses. For my immersion 
class, and to a significant degree for all of the different courses that have so far 
been based on the Davis/Davenport narratives, a central objective is to teach 
the core legal doctrine covered in the common casebook course. In short, 
then, we draw from clinical methodology to create a richer version of the more 
traditional law school classroom.
B. Teaching Legal Doctrine by Experiential Immersion is an Extension of Much Current and 
Prior Thinking about Legal Education
Immersive law teaching is in many ways consonant with the proposals 
for reforming legal education that were put forth by the influential Carnegie 
Report in 2007.177 It is, though, probably more ambitiously radical. 
The Carnegie approach classified coursework grounded in Langdellian case 
dialogue as uniquely effective in inculcating one of the “three apprenticeships” 
176. Jeff Giddings, Why No Clinic Is an Island: The Merits and Challenges of Integrating Clinical Insights Across 
the Law Curriculum, 34 wash. U. J. l & Pol’Y 261, 265 (2010). Both this portrayal and Kruse’s 
share a common process of planning for/doing/critically reflecting upon the work that real 
lawyers would undertake in a given scenario, which seems to get to the heart of the processes 
of clinical instruction. See Myths and Misconceptions, supra note 58, at 24.
177. carNegie rePort, supra note 88. Though we many have moved past that era, there was 
a significant period in which virtually all discussion of legal education referenced the 
Carnegie Report, usually in the context of Roy Stuckey’s near-simultaneously released 
best Practices for legal edUcatioN: a visioN aNd a roadmaP (2007) [just as a prior 
cohort of reformers nearly universally referenced the equally visionary yet not ultimately 
transformative task force report lead by Robert MacCrate in 1992, legal edUcatioN aNd 
ProfessioNal develoPmeNt]. Both the Carnegie Report and Best Practices had complementary, 
though not identical, notions of legal knowledge, skills and values, as well as a similar desire 
to craft models of a more comprehensive legal education that placed greater emphasis on 
experiential professional instructions. Not coincidentally, both of them relied heavily on 
reflections from Peggy Cooper Davis. carNegie rePort, supra note 88, at 39–40, 42, 57, 
200–01; best Practices, supra note 66 at 99, 147, 207–09, 216–18.
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the report identified as central to the making of new lawyers.178 But the report 
was more ambivalent about law schools’ effectiveness in professional or 
ethical training,179 and consequently called on legal educators to incorporate 
additional training in practically oriented coursework to appropriately balance 
what it deemed the cognitive, ethical, and practical apprenticeships necessary 
to developing well-prepared attorneys. 180 The Carnegie Report did call for 
an “integrative” approach to the incorporation of the analytical, ethical, and 
practical dimensions of legal work rather than an “additive” one, but it did 
so only briefly.181 And the report’s immense appreciation for the “signature 
pedagogy” of Socratic case dialogue182 used almost exclusively throughout the 
first year of legal education—and frequently thereafter183—may have led readers 
to mistakenly conclude that the drafters supported the introduction of more 
“integrated”184 coursework primarily in skills classes that would be coequal but 
adjacent to more traditional casebook courses.
Notwithstanding the Carnegie authors’ possible intentions, a recent study 
of the reach of post-Carnegie curricular innovation in law schools concluded 
that where changes did occur they were most likely to involve lawyering skills 
classes and/or clinical courses offered as electives in the second and third 
years.185 Significantly, most current law professors—and law students—would 
probably agree with Katherine R. Kruse’s assertion that the legal academy still 
actively and passively dichotomizes legal theory from legal practice.186 Kruse 
makes clear that this split is both conceptually untrue (she calls it mythical187) 
and educationally unwise, and she argues that a well-balanced law curriculum 
178. carNegie rePort, supra note 88, at 47–7;. see also William M. Sullivan, After Ten Years: The Carnegie 
Report and Contemporary Legal Education, 14 U. st. thomas L.J. 331, 335 (2018) (summarizing 
the report as having found that pervasive case-dialogue teaching in law schools failed to 
provide “training in the full range of capacities needed for legal practice,” and neglected the 
development of “ethical and contextual dispositions essential to professional identity”).
179. carNegie rePort, supra note 88, at 30–32, 89–91, 127–28.
180. Id. at 194–97.
181. Id. at 191–92.
182. Id. at 23–34.
183. Criticized by Carnegie authors as potentially redundant and producing diminishing returns. 
Id. at 75–78.
184. Professor Davis shares some of the Carnegie Report authors’ appreciation for the educational 
value of Socratic dialogue, but advocates repositioning the goal as “desegregating” 
analytical, ethical, and practical teaching rather than “integrating” it. See Peggy Cooper 
Davis, Desegregating Legal Education, 26 ga. st. U. l. rev. 1271, 1291 (2010); see also Peggy 
Cooper Davis & Elizabeth Ehrenfest Steinglass, A Dialogue About Socratic Teaching, 23 N.Y.U. 
rev. l. & soc. chaNge 249 (1998) (analyzing and illustrating intensive Socratic inquiry in 
the law classroom). 
185. Stephen Daniels et al., Analyzing Carnegie’s Reach: The Contingent Nature of Innovation, 63 J. legal 
edUc. 585, 609 (2014).
186. Myths and Misconceptions, supra note 58, at 7.
187. Id. at 9.
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should consist of a progressive sequencing of instruction that fully integrates 
doctrinal and professional skills learning.188 Kruse is hardly a lone voice 
articulating this claim; her critique of legal education’s cramped cabining 
of legal doctrine and professional skills is widely shared, though perhaps 
varyingly framed by different critics.189
In fact, in theorizing about ways to improve learning in twenty-first-century 
law schools, a lot of scholars have suggested teaching in ways that embed legal 
doctrine within practical experiences.190 Using slightly different descriptive 
language or frameworks than ours, numerous law professors began creating 
such courses more than a generation ago.191 
And yet . . . such courses are hardly ordinary. To the contrary, they still 
generally remain unusual enough to warrant their own descriptive law review 
articles.192 [If you are currently connected to a law school, ask yourself: Is 
there more than one such course offered? Is there even one at all?] Despite 
persistent calls for substantial change, immersion-style instruction remains 
188. This echoes Anthony G. Amsterdam’s groundbreaking conception of staged legal education 
as beginning from basic doctrinal and reasoning skills introduction, then applied in finely 
crafted simulation courses curated to refine practical skills and reinforce conceptual learning, 
and concluding with closely supervised apprenticeship experiences in the form of live-client 
clinical work. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education—A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. 
Legal Educ. 612, 616 (1984).
189. Indeed, Gerald P. López contends that the vision embodied in clinical programs should 
“define the fundamental orientation, design and staffing of every law school across the 
country.” Transform—Don’t Just Tinker With—Legal Education (Part II), 24 cliNical l. rev. 247, 
250 (2018). 
190. For an early and especially influential example, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Legacy of 
Clinical Education: Theories about Lawyering, 29 clev. st. l. rev. 555 (1980). For more current 
examples, see Jennifer E. Spreng, Suppose the Class Began the Day the Case Walked in the Door: 
Accepting Standard 314’s Invitation to Imagine a More Powerful, Professionally Authentic First-Year Learning 
Experience, 95 U. det. mercY l. rev. 421 (2018); Sheldon Krantz & Michael Millemann, 
Legal Education in Transition: Trends and Their Implications, 94 Neb. l. rev. 1, 18-29 (2015); R. 
Michael Cassidy, Reforming the Law School Curriculum from the Top Down, 64 J. legal edUc. 428, 
432–37 (2015). 
 Immersive teaching was also envisioned as central to student learning in the hypothetical 
idealized learning-centered law school of the future as envisioned by Rebecca Flanagan in 
Better by Design: Implementing Meaningful Change for the Next Generation of Lawyers, 71 me. l. rev. 103, 
106 (2019).
191. Paul Barron, Can Anything Be Done to Make the Upper-Level Law School Courses More Interesting? 70 
tUl. l. rev. 1881 (1996) (spoiler alert: yes) (describing an immersive upper-level course in 
bankruptcy law and advocating for more widespread adoption of the methodology across 
a variety of substantive areas of law); Phyllis G. Coleman & Robert M. Jarvis, Using Skills Training 
to Teach First-Year Contracts, 44 drake l. rev. 725 (1996); Roberto L. Corrada, Development, A 
Simulation of Union Organizing in a Labor Law Class, 46 J. legal edUc. 445 (1996); Robert G. 
Vaughn, Use of Simulations in a First-Year Civil Procedure Class, 45 l. legal edUc. 480 (1995); Stacy 
Caplow, Autopsy of a Murder: Using Simulation to Teach First Year Criminal Law, 19 N. mex. l. rev. 
138 (1989).
192. See, e.g., Karl S. Coplan, Teaching Substantive Environmental Law and Practice Skills Through Interest 
Group Role-Playing, 18 Vt. J. ENvtl. L. 194 (2016); David B. Oppenheimer, Using a Simulated 
Case File to Teach Civil Procedure: The Ninety-Percent Solution, 65 J. legal edUc. 817 (2016).
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reserved for specialized courses and usually ones in the upper-level curriculum 
that are chiefly focused on strengthening professional skills. It is not seen as 
a primary means of both teaching legal doctrine and integrating (or to use 
Davis’ formulation, desegregating) ethical and professional learning with 
mastery of legal rules and reasoning. 
So why is it that immersive teaching is not a commonplace—even on its way 
to becoming a signature—legal pedagogy? 
Perhaps this is a byproduct of our unfortunate habit in the legal academy of 
imagining the teaching of legal doctrine as distinct from practical training.193 
Or our hierarchies and differential categorization of the law teachers who 
do primarily Socratic case-method teaching194 from those whose teaching 
emphasizes practical skills and professional ethics.195 Maybe it is due to fear or 
overwork. Concerns about expertise (and lack of).196 The linear ease and ready 
availability of a course design driven by the process of casebook selection.197 
Concerns about topical coverage and/or substantive depth.198 Perhaps despite 
the many calls for legal education reform and the clear desire of the bar,199 
193. The Analyzing Carnegie’s Reach study found far more movement toward individually 
initiated curricular innovation than it did meaningful alteration of faculty development 
or in the traditional faculty incentive structures. Carnegie’s Reach, supra note 186, at 609–11. 
The survey’s authors found glimmers of hope for movement toward a more coordinated 
model of lawyer preparation in the future but concluded that for the most part, integrated 
curricular innovation often continued to be isolated or “piecemeal.” See id. at 609.
194. Although apart from history and habit there is no reason attention to these other aspects 
of lawyers’ training cannot have an important place in the doctrinal classroom. See Paula 
Schaefer, A Primer on Professionalism for Doctrinal Professors, 81 teNN. l. rev. 277 (2014) (calling 
on all teachers of legal doctrine to explicitly integrate “attorney professionalism” into their 
course objectives and outlining means of doing so).
195. For but one recent reference to the negative effects of stratification within law 
teaching, see Lawprofblog, Legal Writing Professors: A Story of a Hierarchy Within a 
Hierarchy, above the law (Sept. 4, 2018), https://abovethelaw.com/2018/09/
legal-writing-professors-a-story-of-a-hierarchy-within-a-hierarchy/.
196. See Martin J. Katz, Facilitating Better Law Teaching—Now, 62 emorY L.J. 823, 833 (2013) (raising 
a concern that “not every professor has the type of training that prepares them to do good 
simulations”) [hereinafter Facilitating Better Law Teaching]. 
197. See michael hUNter schwartz, soPhie m. sParrow & gerald f. hess, teachiNg law 
bY desigN 37–54 (2009) (urging law faculty to design courses intentionally and with an 
emphasis on learning goals, and only secondarily selecting casebooks to complement those 
objectives).
198. Coverage of topical material is a perennial—though perhaps overstated—concern in most 
doctrinally focused law classes. Id. at 48. Depth of exploration of central legal questions 
also matters tremendously. We believe immersion teaching can emphasize either or both. 
Simulation design can be modified to give broad exposure to myriad topics in immersion 
classes, to stimulate intense inquiry into principal themes, or to balance both.
199. See Mark A. Cohen, Law Schools Must Restructure. It Won’t Be Easy, forbes (maY 15, 2017), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/markcohen1/2017/05/15/law-schools-must-restructure-it-wont-be-
easy/#2f86efc03d3f; Bruce Antkowiak, Law schools must reform: They need to leave the ivory tower and 
teach practical lawyering, PittsbUrgh Post-gazette (Jan. 4, 2011), https://www.post-gazette.
com/opinion/Op-Ed/2011/01/04/Law-schools-must-reform/stories/201101040170. 
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there is not yet a firm consensus that learning in law school ought to be more 
integrated.
But I simply do not believe that last conjecture is true. Though I am quite 
certain there are some holdouts, and of course there must be those who have 
legitimate methodological questions to raise, a familiarity with the legal ed 
literature over recent decades suggests that time for debate about integrated 
learning in law school may have passed.200 I therefore presume that there 
already exists a relatively widespread consensus in support of innovative 
immersive experiential learning in law schools,201 and that nonetheless we are 
not yet providing as much of it as we do actually agree we should. This is likely 
due to structural inducements,202 some combination of the factors listed in the 
preceding paragraph, and inertia. And in an absence of multiple immersive 
experiential models from most of our own legal educations, it undoubtedly 
also stems from just not knowing where to start or what the courses would and 
should look like. 
I hope this article provides at least one sample to begin the exciting work of 
imagining this more integrated way to teach and learn law. 
VII. Conclusion
The narratives and commentaries included here are not intended to be 
exhaustive. There is certainly more that can be said on most (probably all) 
topics touched on. This piece is meant, though, to showcase some of the 
kinds of thinking that law students do in immersion classes, and the kinds of 
thinking that goes into implementing them. It is meant to show how much is 
accomplished all at once in such learning: consolidation of doctrine, analytical 
skills and tuning innumerable professional skills.
And to encourage more people to do it.
And to show that it is fun. 
And possible.
200. Stephanie Francis Ward, How experiential learning in law schools became widely accepted, legal 
rebels Podcast (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/rebels_
podcast_episode_043 (interview with law school dean Rodney Smolla, who declares “now 
experiential learning is pretty much accepted by everybody”).
201. Grounded, as SpearIt and Stephanie Smith Ledesma observe, in a richly developed literature 
that recognizes the influence of such educational theorists as John Dewey and Paolo Friere. 
Experiential Education as Critical Pedagogy: Enhancing the Law School Experience, 38 Nova l. rev. 249, 
253–54 (2014).
202. Which many scholars have written about and which probably pose a significant barrier. I 
certainly do not want to downplay the institutional incentives that so often leave curricular 
innovation to the individual enterprise of the unusually energetic, rather than to the legal 
academic establishment. But I likewise do not want to be limited by those realities. There 
is much momentum toward change in legal education and it is helpful, perhaps, but not 
necessarily unrealistically, to assume that there will be more. Reflecting on faculty buy-in 
for curricular reform emphasizing simulations and other experiential learning opportunities 
at Denver Law School, Martin J. Katz concluded generating broad faculty support, even 
despite some concerns and objections, was attainable through a shared planning process. 
Facilitating Better Law Teaching, supra note 197, at 842–43.
